The Awami National Partys proposal to arm thirty thousand civilians with assault rifles will only compound their earlier mistake of surrendering to the militants in Swat. Those making such proposals might consider that the anarchy in NWFP and FATA has been caused by the states inability to disarm the extremists and not by an arms vacuum among the people.
In an area already divided violently along sectarian lines, with ethnic tensions also simmering, mass arming of civilians will only result in the creation of new areas of combat and lawlessness. The proper solution is for the state to establish its writ as the monopoly wielder of force and implementer of the law.
The problems being faced now by the ANP and the country can be traced to the many earlier years of bad policies in tackling militancy, beginning in 1994 with the PPPs succumbing to the same TNSM led by Sufi Mohammad and, most recently, the space the NWFP government provided to these groups during 2002-2007, a period they used to arm and train themselves for the assaults now being witnessed.
It is hardly a coincidence that the extremists, who refrained then from armed action for imposition of Sharia laws in Swat and accepted with equanimity the Supreme Courts overturning of the "Hizba" Bill, have taken to violence only after the NWFP electorate in February 2008 voted overwhelmingly for secular political forces.
Past events do not of course absolve the ANP from the mistakes it is making now in dealing with the insurgents. If, as its proponents claim, the haste in proposing a cease-fire was motivated by the desire for a swift end to the loss of life, it is debatable whether this can be ensured by leaving the TNSM in control of urban areas. Therefore, when this agreement does break down, as it is likely to in the manner of four earlier cease-fires in the region, the State will have to apply even greater force at greater loss of life to dislodge the extremists.
On the other hand, if the cease-fire is merely a tactical maneuver while the security forces and the government reassess their options for a future course of action , both internally and with the new US administration, this does not seem to be the militants understanding of the situation.
Within days of last weeks cease-fire, the TNSM has demanded release of its personnel held prisoner, withdrawal of the Army from Swat and extension of the Nizam-e-Adl also to parts of Hazara Division, with Maulana Sufi Mohammad informing a German interviewer that he "hates democracy and does not believe in elections."
These are not the actions of a beaten force or one in stalemate but of one that is consolidating a dominant political and military position. The Tehrik-e-Talibans unilateral declaration of an "indefinite" cease-fire tends to support this assessment - having gained far more than they expected, it is the militants who now find it expedient to pause, regroup, rearm and consolidate their administrative grip on the territories that have been handed over to them.
Could it be that the motivation behind this cease-fire has a more permanent objective? Is it, for instance, an exchange of "land for peace" as in the Israel-Palestine equation? It cannot be, because that model is based on a "two-state" objective, with preconditions being the renunciation of force by one side and the right to govern Palestinian territories arising from electoral mandate. Even then, despite overwhelming Israeli force, peace remains elusive as Hamas, having acquired limited electoral legitimacy, utilises this to become a parallel military force.
In Swat, by contrast, administrative control of a large chunk of Pakistan territory, including amendment of the basic law therein, has been handed over to the TNSM, an organisation that has no electoral legitimacy and which continues to bear the arms it has used against the state, thereby allowing a small group of armed persons to hold peace and the lives of many people hostage to their demands.
Sadly, what the Palestinians failed to achieve in more than four decades of a legitimate freedom struggle, the TNSM has won, conceding nothing, by unsettling key decision-makers in the NWFP and the PPP through a brief campaign of bombings, torture and dispensation of cruel tribal justice.
The irony is that apologists for the agreement ascribe credibility, even legitimacy, to the TNSM demand for "Nizam-e-Adl" on the grounds that this is commensurate with an Islamic governance system, in spite of the fact that no school of Islamic thought, inside or outside Pakistan, considers this obscurantist and tribal vision of Sharia having nexus with any recognised Islamic Fiqh.
Now a statement by Senator Raza Rabbani advising that the Swat Accord will serve "as a model" for agreements with other militant groups, gives rise to concern that even bigger mistakes are about to be made. Where the ANP assures us that the vision of the militants is confined to imposing their values within a limited geography, the PPP tells us that more territory of Pakistan is to be handed over to other extremists, even before they have made such demands.
A cynical view would be that such ceding of territory is a prelude to the re-drawing of boundaries and the inevitable partitioning of Afghanistan that will precede Americas abandonment of the region. An opposite analysis would be that the territories are being handed over so the US and the militants it created can sort each other out, saving Pakistan the trauma and cost of dealing with both and gaining nothing.
Meanwhile, if the Swat Agreement, as stated by both sides, is only a measure to facilitate delivery of quick justice, the TNSM may be asked to demonstrate its sincerity and allegiance to the state by (i) acknowledging supremacy of the electoral process for a democratic government; (ii) turning over for justice all persons involved in executions, arson, bombings and armed rebellion against the state; (iii) its leadership registering with the Tax Authorities and explaining the source of its funding; (iv) giving a commitment that Pakistans constitutional and international obligations in respect of gender and religious freedoms take precedence over any TNSM agenda; (v) the Qazi courts will not pass judgements that contravene laws and statutes under Pakistans existing justice system; and (vi) disarming militant cadres and allowing law and order to be administered exclusively by state authorities.
Without such safeguards we will be inviting ridicule upon our capacity as a people to understand the basic requirements of responsible governance or safeguarding the interests of the state.
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