Reconciling the Taliban

When the foreign minister, Shah Mahmud Qureshi said that the US is reconsidering its policy on Drone attacks, it conveyed an impression of abatement in such attacks, if not altogether a cessation. Contrary to this impression, reports have surfaced in the American media that the Obama administration is considering Drone attacks in Balochistan as well.
Intriguingly, signals from the US administration still emerge that convey the sense that the US has finally come to the realisation that the use of force alone will not defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Reports say the Obama administration has arrived at the conclusion that as many as 70 percent of the insurgents in Afghanistan are reconcilable, and hence can be persuaded to give up fighting.
The good news for us is that the same is to apply to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as well. In fact, it is not a new conclusion. Towards the end of its term, the Bush administration had also made conciliatory overtures towards the Taliban leader Mullah Omer via the Saudis.
What is different this time though is the change in USs own leadership style as well as policy substance. It may be that the strategy is to take aggression to new heights and simultaneously commence a dialogue process. It may be recalled that holding good on his campaign promises, President Obama has announced a firm timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, closure of the infamous Guantanamo Bay prison, and stoppage of secret renditions programme.
In its latest attempt to reverse a past mistake, Washington has decided to stop using Enemy Combatants designation for people who were arrested in Afghanistan and imprisoned at Guantanamo and denied treatment applicable to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.
Obama has also adopted a more nuanced approach towards Afghanistan, openly acknowledging that the Afghan people have a long history of resistance to foreign occupation. And more to the point, that the US has no intention to stay in that country for the long haul. He has indicated that the US troops would leave Afghanistan as soon as it is stabilised. This should allay the apprehensions of the Taliban and others that Washington has long-term plans to stay in Afghanistan, setting up permanent bases there.
The reconcilable insurgents apparently are fighters who are not ideological allies of the Taliban, but those who joined in the fight either out of a motivation to oust foreign forces from their land; or because they were simply angered by the collateral damage US missile attacks and bombing raids caused. The same is happening in our tribal areas where drone attacks have claimed the lives of scores of innocent people.
This must stop while Islamabad tries to make peace deals with the local people in different parts of our troubled tribal areas. The new strategy should not be restricted to the reconcilable insurgents only. The fact of the matter is that contrary to the al Qaeda agenda, the Taliban fighting foreign forces in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan are not interested in taking their fight to the US or Europe.
Hence instead of seeking to separate the so-called moderate and hence reconcilable militants from the more radical Taliban, the new strategy should focus on making distinction between the Taliban and the al Qaeda elements. Such a policy together with increased economic and military assistance to the now hyphenated Pakistan-Afghanistan can address the real threat in an effective and meaningful manner.
As long as the new strategy has two distinct features, one a stated intention to leave Afghanistan and the other to differentiate between the Taliban and al Qaeda, backed by liberal economic assistance, peace may not take long to return to Afghanistan. And when Afghanistan is pacified, calm will also come back to Pakistans restive tribal belt.