‘No accountability for flood prevention in Pakistan,’ Sarwar Bari, National Coordinator, Pattan Development Organization

Sarwar Bari is the National Coordinator at Pattan Development Organization since 1993. Pattan is a Pakistani NGO working to mainstream marginalized and isolated communities into political and economic decision-making processes. Mr. Bari has more than two decades of experience in election monitoring and governance evaluation. He is also among the founding members and first Secretary General of the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN). Following are selected excerpts from BR Research’s recent sit-down with Mr. Bari in Islamabad:

BR Research: Pattan has almost a quarter century of institutional memory. Based on that, what kind of a development strategy offers the best hope to mainstream the marginalized communities in Pakistan?

Sarwar Bari: We started out by working with riverine communities in 1992, when Pakistan was hit by a mega flood. We soon realized that relief alone would not reduce the hazards of floods. Floods on their own are not a disaster – they are a hazard. During the relief activities, we found that politicians generally behaved in a way not to help the needs of the people, but to consolidate their vote bank. People in the affected areas told us to work directly with them, not through local influentials or community leaders.

So we went ahead on two levels. One, we organized the communities directly. Second, through organized communities, we put pressure on the government for better response to the flood disasters. Both levels tend to help in creating a responsive public policy framework. This remains our thinking.

BRR: What kind of direct community engagement took place and in what areas?

SB: In the direct community engagement, we formed three kinds of associations: children’s organisations, women’s organisations, and men’s organisations. We adopted a rotational leadership method, which provided opportunity to everyone to learn leadership. Decision-making happened through consensus. Ordinary shepherds, milkmen, etc. all had the opportunity and say in those decisions. In 1992, our focus was in three districts – Multan, Muzafargarh, and Sargodha. Based along the river banks, the communities’ livelihoods depended on riverine resources, fishing, livestock, and agriculture.

In 2001, when Musharraf introduced the local government system, we thought it was a great opportunity because now we would have elected representatives, not one, but many at local level. Interestingly, many men and women in the marginalized communities, we had been working with since 1992, wanted to contest elections. Most of them won, defeating the nominees of landlords and other powerful.

BRR: Pakistan is in the midst of a flood season. How prepared is the country today seven years after the super floods of 2010?

SB: The disaster risk reduction (DRR) framework exists. So the policy is there. But there is very little readiness to cope with a super flood. Pakistan has some of the most sophisticated systems, but there is negligence in governance. There is no liability enshrined in the National Disaster Management Act. There is no accountability for flood prevention.

Both in the 1992 and 2010 floods, massive volume of water was released from the large dams without proper planning which converted floods into disasters. The same mistake was repeated in 2014, when the weather forecast in fact alerted the government but no action was taken for improved management. This is an issue of governance. Most of these positions are filled through patronage mechanism.

BRR: Does this lack of governance have anything to do with perverse political incentives linked to disaster relief operations?

SB: This is what I have argued in one of my recent articles. Theoretically we have shifted our policy from ‘disaster response’ to ‘disaster risk reduction’. But policy is implemented selectively. As far as preparedness is concerned, practically we have nothing there. One of the pillars of DRR is the district disaster management authorities. We don’t have any such entity in a single district. Disaster is not going to happen in Islamabad – it takes place in villages.

BRR: What can be done to improve disasters-related governance?

SB: The people and the media need to push and make the officials accountable. We have wonderful DRR policies and structures at the national and provincial levels, but nothing exists at the local level. We need to invest there. Donors, who are funding many state projects in the DRR space, must also be made accountable. Natural disasters like floods are also a very serious economic issue. Just look at the losses incurred in the 2010 floods. This is a recurring problem, which is left to chance.

BRR: Over the years, has Pattan’s scope extended to other areas?

SB: In the first ten years, our focus remained on riverine communities. By 2002, we had realized there were new areas where we could work. Since riverine communities were mostly in distant areas, we decided to link them with other marginalized communities, such as those in the cities. We started working with brick-kiln workers and with marginalized associations, as they were completely disconnected from the political society.

In my view, lack of political participation of the marginalized communities is one of the major causes of Pakistan’s under development and its elitist, poor democracy. Wherever in the world democratization has deepened, the working classes either formed their own political party or they linked with some political party. In Pakistan, our political and economic elite attempted to dislodge rest of the society from political process. So citizens have become mere voters. So it is important for us to look at the whole picture. In that context, we are trying to build a coalition of the marginalized communities.

We believe in addressing governance issues in Pakistan through a holistic approach. DRR comes under that. Elections are also an important arena. As a member organisation of the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), Pattan is working on two levels. One is the monitoring of various government departments such as health and education. We are also working on CNIC registration of women. Some 12 million fewer women are registered to vote than men. You cannot become a voter unless you have a CNIC. We are helping such women in thousands of locations so they can get their CNIC. We are also working on voter education, to make voting a more independent and informed process.

BRR: You have been associated with the process for electoral reforms. Next general elections are expected within a year. Are you hopeful that the inadequacies observed in the 2013 elections will not reappear in the next elections? What can be done now to make things better?

SB: We have to understand that the ruling elites anywhere in the world don’t go for further democratization unless risks to their survival are removed. Alternatively, things can change when people interested in more democratization assert their demands in an organized manner.

The main reason why electoral reforms are not happening in Pakistan is because the rural/landed elite – which rely on ‘immobile’ assets and turn out to be autocratic – still control the bulk of election constituencies in Pakistan. They are not able to anticipate what writing is going to emerge on the wall. So they continue to resist reforms or sabotage reforms. The electoral reform bill in its current form doesn’t do enough to address the issues of democratisation at all.

BRR: What have been the challenges running the organization and reaching its objectives?

SB: We face challenges similar to other civil society organisations (CSO). One of the issues is the NOC regime introduced by the current government, particularly for Southern Punjab. If you want to hold a training workshop, you now need to have the NOC from the deputy commissioner.

Another challenge is that the Pakistani civil society has generally become toothless. Part of it is explained by too much dependence on external funding. The NGOs don’t challenge the government on issues like they used to. This wasn’t the case back in the 1990s.

Moreover, the donors’ funding model, which has changed to the ‘business model’, is a serious challenge. Now big, for-profit international firms, which have nothing to do with the civil society or community development are competing for projects and imposing ‘standarised’ models on local CSOs.

BRR: How does Pattan sustain its operations?

SB: Some of our funding comes from DFID; some of the funds come through FAFEN, from USAID; we also get some funding from a German Foundation – FES; then we also have our own resources such as endowments and assets.

BRR: Lastly, after 25 years, what do you think has been Pattan’s biggest achievement?

SB: In the context of what is happening in Pakistan, we have zero achievement. Sometimes you really feel that you are trying to fill a bucket, which doesn’t have a bottom, so it will never fill. Perhaps our effort is very small. We need to do more.

But if I look at our work without the context, we feel we have done a lot, like the creation of FAFEN. In 2002, Pattan was the only election monitoring organization in Pakistan. The second breakthrough is relating to DRR. In the 90s, when we formed the Pakistan Disaster Mitigation Network, people only used to look at disaster response, and not mitigation (or DRR). Today, we have a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). Pakistan now has the largest members among all the countries represented in the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR).

Lastly, I would like to say, CSOs must act the way like they used to in the 1990s. We need to challenge those who violate our rights and are involved in corruption. We must shame them by naming them.