Selective amnesia

Does an idea work because it is good? Or is an idea good because it works? Talking to BBC Urdu last week, Pakistan’s ex-president Pervez Musharraf suggested that military rule was a good idea for Pakistan because it put things back on track. He chided the politicians for messing things up, leaving the khakis to come in and pick up the pieces.

This August marks nine years since Musharraf quit his nine-year rule. But he still divides public opinion. Musharraf’s currency may have waned, but in the wake of Panama verdict he has grown more vocal about his ideas. But does his recent, blunt advocacy for non-democratic dispensation suggest that The Times They Are a-Changin’ in Pakistan again?

The minds of many well-meaning Pakistanis hearken back to what they refer to as the ‘good times’ back in the 2000’s. Some folks who were old enough in the eighties also recollect that era fondly. And some economics professors and historians cast the sixties as Pakistan’s ‘decade of development’.

Indeed, the three khaki decades were, overall, eras of economic expansion and relative stability. But looked in the proper context, things are not as black and white as Musharraf would have folks believe. There are both structural and historical reasons behind why non-democratic regimes are seen as better at governance than their civilian counterparts.

First, dysfunction is inherent to a democracy. Elected governments rule by consensus among a diverse set of political interests. Decisions are often delayed. Sectoral policies are often watered-down glimmer of what a technocrat would approve of. But democratic dysfunction is not a disease. It’s a process that can be made better by negotiating suavely and renewing political capital. As for dictators, they rule by decree. So it is unsurprising to see their policies fizzle out after they leave office. Remember Ayub’s constitution?

Second, democracy and a freer press tend to go side by side. So naturally, one hears more of the bad stuff, counter narratives, even conspiracy theories during the elected eras. This is not the case in a dictatorial regime, which brooks no interference, dissent, or opposition. Musharraf may have liberalized the media industry, but there was a limit to the newfound freedom.

Third is a case of spectacular coincidence. Soon after coming to power, each of the three military regimes – Ayub in the sixties, Zia in the eighties, and Musharraf in the 2000’s – found a strategic opening to play pals with the United States. From the Cold War to the War on Terror (WoT), Pakistan’s military presidents allied their country with Uncle Sam, receiving significant economic aid and technical assistance in return.

The international acceptance Pakistan gained through US alliance and the resulting dollar inflows stabilized the economy, helping unleash retail expansion later on. By a curious twist of fate, the economic bounty would start to dry up every time civilians took back control. Some even argue that elected governments had to face the aftermath of the security policies pursued by Messrs Zia and Musharraf.

And fourth, because Pakistanis have historically alternated between civilian and military regimes roughly every decade, short-term highs are remembered more in popular discourse than long-term policy consequences. Result is, Nawaz Sharif is not remembered for his privatization and deregulation in the nineties, just as Benazir Bhutto never got enough credit for her social sector programs.

But Musharraf – who didn’t invest much in power projects or large dams – is celebrated for an economic boom that proved short-lived, but doesn’t get berated enough for the national suffering in the aftermath of joining the WoT. Instead, he is recalled as a benign dictator.

It is quite debatable which form of government comes out on top. As they slowly self correct, elected governments – which still face tenure uncertainty – need a few more electoral cycles to become efficient. Au contraire, a khaki-supervised technocratic government can take some good decisions quickly. But that is unsustainable in the long-run – folks grow tired of one regime and start to agitate seven, eight years later. If Pakistan wants to move past square one, it’s wise not to drive while looking in the rearview mirror.