Karzai's second term

The uniqueness of President Obama's worldview isn't aptly reflected in the pattern of United States historical positions in its relations with other states. So, no wonder, his administration had taken a dim view of President Hamid Karzai's intention to stand for a second term. And even when he had won in the first round, he was made to offer himself for the runoff - which ultimately turned out to be merely an exercise in futility.
The Obama administration had nurtured hopes of pro-West presidential alternates like Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah winning the presidential race, though Hamid Karzai, too, has never been anti-West. Now with Karzai back in the presidential palace, despite Washington's intense manoeuvring for the opposite, the concerned US officials appear to be recalibrating their perceptions of President Karzai's ability to deliver.
Secretary of State Clinton understands that he was not vague, but "much more specific about battling corruption" and "we are under no illusions about the difficulties of this mission". The Nato countries' high-profile attendance of President Karzai's inauguration also confirms the belief that for the next five years they would like to see him as the West's man-on-the-spot in Afghanistan.
Rightly then President Karzai doesn't feel beholden to the United States or the Nato countries for his victory. But that doesn't mean he is not going to re-fix his priorities. He conceded there is rampant corruption, but promised to control it by tightening the anti-corruption mechanisms. He also vowed to take on the drug barons, though he knows and all understand that it would not be so easy, given that throughout the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan, eradicating narco-trade has not been a priority.
But where President Karzai has a real chance of making some headway is in enlarging his support base. During the concluding months of his first term he had openly criticised the civilian casualties of the ISAF operations, and more than once he invited the Taliban to the negotiating table. A more tangible move would be a call to host a Loya Jirga 'to address the insurgency', which is fast acquiring a strong ethnic dimension. He is essentially a Pushtun warlord and fully comprehends the role of tribal leaders in a decentralised country like Afghanistan.
To what extent the US government is in sync with the emerging reality in Afghanistan we would know only when the Obama administration makes public its strategic review of its Afghan policy. For sure, Afghanistan is not the same as when the US-led international forces came there, almost a decade ago. However, from Pakistan's perspective of the multi-faceted Afghan imbroglio, two developments are of crucial importance. First, Pakistan would like to be taken into confidence on this review, because induction of more US troops would have a direct bearing on its security.
And so would be a hasty exit. Second, Islamabad is deeply concerned over India using Afghan soil to foment insurgency in Pakistan. After months of low-tone leaks, the Pakistan government is now openly accusing India of sending in men and weapons.
There is all kind of talk about Western powers' policies and plans in Afghanistan. Britain is said to be in cahoots with the 'soft Taliban' for coalition administrations in some of Afghanistan's north-eastern and eastern provinces adjacent to Pakistan. That a trust-deficit obtains between Pakistan and the West on the political future of Afghanistan was clearly reflected in President Zardari's strongly urging Secretary Clinton to be taken on board regarding the US strategic review. But that lopsidedness gets compensated by the rapport that exists between President Zardari and his Afghan counterpart, Hamid Karzai. Such an equation is obliged to warm up the much-needed direct contact between Islamabad and Kabul.