On the second death anniversary of his wife, President Asif Ali Zardari launched his fiery counter-attack against a brewing conspiracy to derail his government.
Others before him had hurled some salvos against the conspirators, however, many were either dismissed as being anti-Pakistan, an example being the angry speech of the Sindh Interior Minister, where he revealed that the PPP was going to break Pakistan after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but was stayed by the President; or simply delusional, an example being the statement by the government's lawyer during the hearing of the National Reconciliation Ordinance that the CIA and the ISI could try to destabilise the country. The President's speech, however, lent greater credence to the government's perceived concerns, which have gathered momentum as the President has made more public appearances in less than 15 days than he had in the past year.
The media has been at great pains to get a senior member of the PPP, in the government or outside, to identify the conspirators. Some PPP members have pointed a finger at a media group in particular, others have obliquely mentioned the judiciary and argued that parts of the decision on the NRO were Zardari-specific and still others have mentioned the establishment - though several PPP loyalists have hastened to add that General Kiyani, the chief of army staff, is on the same page as the government.
Analysts, to some extent, agree and have expressed the opinion that the army high command does not trust the President for two reasons. First, the President's initial India policy was perceived as an open challenge to the army's long-standing policy of strategic depth; and, second, the establishment's belief that Pakistan's Ambassador to the US was directed by the government to include in the Kerry-Lugar bill clauses that the army has since publicly opposed.
The traditional conspirator against the democratically-elected governments in general and the PPP in particular, the establishment, was, according to the PPP, being strengthened by the judiciary as well as the media. The press was no longer fair or balanced pro-Zardari loyalists proclaimed, but were a party to ongoing attempts to destabilise the government.
The leader of the opposition, Nawaz Sharif, has time and again stated that his party would not join forces with any institution/entity bent on destabilising the government. However, in recent days, he has urged those responsible to bring back looted wealth from Switzerland, seen as Zardari-specific. Be that as it may, it is also pertinent to point out that many believe that Nawaz Sharif has the capacity to once again, mobilise the public against the present government, like he did during the long march. However, he has precluded that possibility so far. In addition, no other political party, be it in coalition with the PPP or opposed to it, has actually come out in support of the conspirators.
What is ironical and consistent with the past, in spite of an independent judiciary and a fearless media, is that no one has bothered to assess the views on such matters from the people of this country. Surveys note the performance of the government, or its lack thereof, the popularity of the provincial governments, or lack thereof, the public's assessment of the economy, but not how much credibility the public places on conspiracy theories or supports the same. What does the public think of the recent speeches, by not only members of the government and opposition but also the decisions taken by the judiciary and the line taken by the media?
Pro-PPP loyalists citing the recent sweeping victory of the PPP in Gilgit-Baltistan election claim that the PPP's popularity is undiminished, in spite of the low personal popularity ratings of the President. Anti-PPP analysts point to a range of economic issues that are increasingly bringing the public out in the streets in protest: massive load shedding and price rise of essentials. However, these are so far localised protests and do not constitute a threat, not unless a political party is able to harness this protest for purposes of destabilising the government, or so claim analysts.
At the end of the day, however, the general public is unlikely to extend full support to any party against the government unless it feels that the government is ignoring its economic interests. These interests cannot only be defined collectively, but also individually. In this context, decisions that affect us collectively are three-fold. First, the government's decision to put the country on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme with its accompanying conditions, has negatively affected us collectively.
The IMF programme has supported key macroeconomic indicators. The IMF in its third review under the Stand-By Arrangement has stated that "despite the progress made on the stabilisation front, Pakistan's underlying vulnerabilities remain high and have increased in some areas. In particular vulnerabilities are fuelled by continued revenue shortfalls, an increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs), energy subsidies, and large dependence on commodity imports. A credible fiscal consolidation, strengthened competitiveness over the medium term, and improved governance are indispensable for reducing these vulnerabilities." None of these disturbing elements can be laid at the doorstep of the previous government. They remain as the outcome of two budgets presented by the PPP government.
Additionally, not mentioned in the above statement, is massive load shedding that mitigates the impact of any other policy in support of domestic productivity, massive gas shortages and high interest rates that are targeted to support efforts to ensure external stability and liquidity pressures arising from the government's large domestic financing needs; but are at the cost of reduced borrowing by the private sector, thereby negatively impacting on gross domestic product, inflation and unemployment. NPLs, the review adds, are also increasing for which the responsibility must rest with the government. The review adds that banks' assets have shifted toward government and government-guaranteed instruments. Failure to enhance revenue may partly be attributed to low productivity, but mainly to what the IMF regards as "significant lags" in reforms as well as the continued failure of the Tokyo pledges to be disbursed.
Second, the much-hailed consensus on the National Finance Commission award. This landmark decision, hailed from all quarters, will no doubt favourably impact on us collectively; but not individually, or at least not in the short term.
Third, the allegations of corruption/kickbacks and nepotism are continuing to this day; examples include newspaper reports on the frequent flouting of public procurement rules and regulations, for example in the awarding of rental power projects, as well as the appointment of the former Pakistan Steel chairman who lost the company billion of rupees in one year alone. However, in this country, allegations of corruption, even if supported by proof, have rarely turned public opinion against the party in power during elections.
What government policy/decision or non-decision has affected us individually and is mobilising public opinion against the government? The expression, 'it is the economy stupid' is relevant. In this context, the government has been forced to raise electricity tariffs as per IMF conditions, which has led to higher electricity bills for considerably reduced supply. Projects designed to alleviate Loadshedding, from sources that would enable cheap price of electricity, are too few. Gas Loadshedding has resulted in the inability of households to prepare meals. High prices of essentials due to hoarding and profiteering are seen as the government's responsibility as it not only fails to implement Supreme Court decision on sugar price, but also continues to resist strengthening the implementation powers of the Competition Commission of Pakistan. Rich groups, including parliamentarians, remain exempt from taxes while the burden continues to fall on the salaried people.
The government's Benazir Income Support Programme has run into difficulties according to the IMF review: "the programme of Rs 70 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) was intended to provide support for 5 million families in 2009/10 and to be extended to 7 million families by 2010/11. However, only part of BISP resources, budgeted for 2009/10, is expected to be delivered using the new enhanced targeting system." Implicit in the use of the words 'enhanced targeting system' are concerns over the identification of beneficiaries by the government.
But with security expenditures, sourced to ongoing operations against the Taliban, expected to rise and the bilaterals, not converting pledges made in Tokyo into disbursements, is the economy ready to turn a corner within the year? Unless it raises taxes significantly, the burden of which may fall on the lower to middle income groups if past precedent is anything to go by, the country would have to seek additional support from the IMF. To argue that any additional support reflects the IMF confidence in the policies of the government is true only, if the armed forces target the Taliban, who are not targeting Pakistani forces, but US forces in Afghanistan. It is hoped that the Finance Ministry is sufficiently pragmatic to realise that if the US withdraws its support within the IMF, it is unlikely that the subsequent tranche releases will be contingent on requests for waiver.
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