Nuclear security summit

These days nuclear matters are on the centre stage of international affairs. America's 'Nuclear Posture Review' (NPR) and signing of 'Nuclear Arms Treaty' between the US and Russia has set the wheel in motion for the far more trickier event of 'Nuclear Security Summit' (NSS), where around 47 states would deliberate the measures to strengthen nuclear security regimes.
Through NPR, America has unilaterally opted to cut its nuclear prowess and abide by stringent conditions in the context of first use of nuclear weapons. Such steps are aimed at demonstrating nuclear restraints. The NPR decisions of no further testing, non-development of new missiles and not to make the missiles with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) would significantly scale down American nuclear prowess.
Signing of 'Nuclear Arms Treaty' in Prague, by the Presidents of the US and Russia is another refreshing event. World would have 30% lesser long range nukes by 2017. Moreover, the UN nuclear fuel bank would be ready by December this year. This facility would offer nuclear fuel to the countries, wishing to produce nuclear power. This would plug a hole leading to proliferation on the pretext of enriching uranium for peaceful application.
Though these non-proliferation-related measures would provide a conducive environment, the NSS would surely remain a complicated venue to handle. Out of three countries likely to come under focus, Iran and North Korea won't be attending and Israel would have a scaled down presence.
While this entire hullabaloo is on with a great fanfare, some of the contradictions in American approach towards nuclear safety are raising the eyebrows. Pragmatism demanded that all international nuclear deal be put on hold till the global nuclear management takes a concrete and recognisable format. However, it is interesting to see that some of the affiliated instruments of Agreement 123 (US-India nuclear deal) were concluded in an indecent haste. For example, America and India have recently signed a nuclear fuel reprocessing agreement.
Prior to signing, India was required to establish a 'Civil Nuclear Liability Regime' to limit compensation by American nuclear companies operating in India, in case of nuclear accidents. So far the Indian government has not been able to do so. Yet, America has hurriedly signed the instrument.
As a consequence, India has eight 'liberated' nuclear reactors outside the purview of IAEA churning out sufficient fissile material to produce around 280 nuclear warheads per year! Regions having nuclear or threshold capabilities harbour an environment of inter-state tension. Some of these countries face existential threats form their neighbours.
These perceptions have deep-rooted historic groundings and cannot just be wished away. Regional dynamics are far different from the post-cold war US-Russian relations. Hence, each region would need a different approach towards non-proliferation objectives.
Unnecessary singling out of Iran and bracketing it with North Korea is another cardinal error of judgement. North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapon state whereas Iran has never shown such ambitions. Overplaying Iranian capability to justify tough sanction would always be construed as part of a bigger objective of regime change. Threat perception of Iran needs to be taken care of and ways and means should be evolved to address these concerns. An offer of irrevocable negative assurances alongside provision of missile shield could lessen her anxiety.
A nuclear Israel would continue to remain a potential catalyst for horizontal proliferation in the entire Middle East region. There is a need to bring Israel out of a policy of strategic silence over its nuclear assets and ambiguity over its nuclear doctrine, so that one could quantify the threat which these assets could pose as well as figure out its potential targets. This would demystify the de facto nuclear environment, functional in that region, at least since Yom Kipper days.
Conventional and nuclear doctrines have become so intricately enmeshed in regional settings that it is no longer possible to discern them individually. They have become a mysterious continuum. Practically, regions of these newly emerged nuclear weapon states have lost the option of going into even a limited conventional conflict, without the fear of escalating into a nuclear shootout.
In Pakistan-India setting, at least three wars have been averted due to this fear of escalation. Nevertheless, sentiments on Kashmir never cooled off. Likewise, though there has been no formal war in the Middle East since 1973, the region has not been at peace, either. These hot spots carry on simmering, looking for an opportune time to explode. Denuclearization of these conflict harbouring regions would unleash conventional wars for settling these disputes.
Fissile material management amongst the nuclear weapon states is area needing an imaginative rather than a traditional approach. Arbitrary imposition of a cut-off date for fissile material without taking into account, existing stocks is likely to perpetuate the status quo with respect to inventory of weapons, which would be detrimental to late entrants of reprocessing club.
Though security of fissile material is a genuine concern, it must not be overplayed to impose an arbitrary cut-off date. Major attention should focus on transparent inventorying of current holding and future production; security measures can only be implemented effectively when the holding is accounted for, accurately. Such regime must be non-discriminatory having global acceptance, and embodying binding and verifiable instruments.
(The writer is a retired Air Commodore of Pakistan Air Force)