The ongoing strategic dialogue in Washington may not have a clear road ahead. American interests skewed towards short to medium term goals are in conflict with Pakistan's long term objectives, albeit the common interest on table is to eradicate extremism, primarily in Afghanistan. So the discussions are tactical for America and strategic for Pakistan.
Though the war-on-terror was initiated by the US and allies in the aftermath of 9/11, it has slowly but surely, also emerged as Pakistan's issue, due to the alignment of the Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan with their Pashtun brethren across the border in Afghanistan.
Because of growing fiscal constraints in the developed Western world, together with great criticism on the Iraq war, the exit of the armed forces of the US and its allies from the region is inevitable before the next presidential elections in the US, scheduled for November, 2012. The promised dates for exit by the Obama administration start even a year before it.
At this juncture, both the parties (US and Pakistan) have agreed, and to some extent, albeit independently, are also working on staging a shift of power in Afghanistan to the Afghans. But the US is not ready to compromise with the single ethnic majority - the Pashtuns - who are almost 50% of the total population. This is because of the Taliban factor and also because government and law enforcement institutions, build predominantly by Nato forces, are empowering other ethnic groups - Tajiks and Uzbeks.
This is in conflict with Pakistan's India-centric approach. Historically, India used Persian-speaking Afghans - Northern Alliance - against Pakistan. Pakistan's bone of contention against India is the water issue, which cannot be undermined at any cost.
All the water in Pakistan emanates from the Indus Basin situated in Indian-occupied Kashmir, and, India, at a number of occasions, has breached the Indus Water Treaty (1960). Pakistan cannot give up control of its water resources to India perpetually, especially since floods and droughts are likely to be a common occurrence for the country in future. Recent floods in Pakistan could just be a tip of the iceberg.
So Pakistan's quest from the US should be to at least use its clout to ensure Pakistan's legitimate needs, if not fully resolve the water concern with India by designing and implementing an amicable solution to the Kashmir issue. However, the US, on the flip side, is insisting Pakistan to combat the Haqqani group in North Waziristan just like the Pakistan army dealt with the Mehsud group in South Waziristan.
But, unlike the latter, which was becoming a cancer in Pakistan's urban areas, the former historically, helped Pakistan in forming a Pashtun government in Afghanistan. Now with a clear exit strategy of the US from the region, Pakistan has no choice but to deal with these issues in its backyard. It's an established historic fact that none other than a Pashtun-dominated government can bring some sort of sanity in Afghanistan and the western border of Pakistan.
Civilian economic talks are likely to subside in the ongoing moot because of these issues. The agenda of the US to support Pakistan in the areas of energy, health, education, science and technology, removal of trade barriers, and so on and so forth, might end in a deadlock owing to military concerns. This is also very clear from America's persistent reluctance to give Pakistani textile made-ups zero-rated entry into the US.
The development of reconstruction zones in FATA, which is imperative for development and long-term peace in the area is a meaningless pipe dream. The delay in the pending $2.5 billion under the Coalition Support Fund speaks volumes of the tense relations between the two unequal allies.
As far as FoDPs are concerned, the US, has a valid argument as to why the US and other countries taxpayers should help Pakistan when the latter is not adequately taxing its elite. On the contrary, however, if America refuses to take up the Kashmir issue seriously, on grounds that Pakistan has not been using its water resources efficiently, as is evident from the inter-provincial conflicts that hindered the construction of much-needed dams, barrages and canals, its argument won't carry a lot of weight.
The only material development in Washington is going to be on the military hardware support of $2 billion, which will be equally divided in the next five years as expectations build up for Pakistan to fight towards curbing extremism after the exit of American forces.
However, more importantly, there is an issue of mistrust on both sides; the US army doesn't trust the Pakistan government or the army, while the Pakistani people don't trust the US government. In such an uncomfortable and perplexing environment, any positive socio-economic outcome under the name of "strategic dialogue" is unlikely to be seen.
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