Washington's Institute of Peace was recently the venue of an extensive discussion on "The Future of Pakistan," where leading South Asia experts, including the well-known scholar Stephen Cohen, and Christine Fair, an assistant professor at Georgetown University, argued that Pakistan should be offered talks for a civilian nuclear deal similar to the one US gave India in 2008.
Fair said an offer for a nuclear deal should be put on the table for "creating a negotiating space we don't have right now." Cohen wondered "why in principle or in practice we couldn't offer the same thing to the Pakistanis?" Why, indeed? One reason, of course, is that Washington views India as a long-term strategic ally, and hence is willing to overlook its transgressions - such as refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and continuing to test-explode nuclear devices and nuclear capable missile systems - to grant it special concessions. The other and more often cited excuse to deny Pakistan a similar treatment is the alleged proliferation activities of the so-called Dr Qadeer network.
The US seeks partnership with Pakistan as well, though of a different nature. Yet as Fair indirectly pointed out there exists a trust deficit between the two countries, which needs to be bridged. Pakistan makes no secret of the fact that its defence posture is India-centric. Its nuclear explosions in 1998 were a tit-for-tat response to India's.
If Pakistan has not signed the NPT so far that is also because India has not done so. It needs to be said, however, that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is based on minimal deterrence. India's civilian nuclear deal has upset the equation in a big way.
The deal is to bring India nuclear material as well as advanced technical know-how. True, it would be required to separate the military and civilian nuclear programmes, still the know-how gained in the new programme can be applied to the other. Equally important, it gives India a de facto recognition as a nuclear power.
So far as the proliferation issue is concerned, it is history long past. Pakistan has since undertaken strict measures under a Strategic Planning Division set up in 2002 to ensure safety of nuclear materials and assets. US administration officials have repeatedly expressed satisfaction with these measures.
Even so, if Pakistan gets a civilian nuclear programme, that, of course, would be conditioned on opening it up to IAEA inspections. The non-proliferation goals can thus be better served by offering this country a civilian nuclear deal than by denying the same. Such a deal will also grant indirect recognition to this country's status as a nuclear power, putting it at par with its main rival. That would lend it greater confidence to negotiate with US in an atmosphere of trust. Clearly, there are more pros than cons in the proposal for the US as well.
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