Osama's killing continues to shake the earth; we now know that the US intelligence agencies differed over the missions to kill Osama and Colonel Qadhafi, who too was to be targeted. According to Leon Panetta, except "circumstantial evidence" there was zero-proof of Osama's presence in Abbottabad. So, were the differences over the 5-time dead Osama being alive?
Or were they over Pakistan's reaction to the attack, or just on tactical issues? But Panetta silenced the dissidents with President Obama's support who felt that killing Osama and Qadhafi could up his ratings, facilitate ending the Afghan war that impoverished America, control Libya, and get him re-elected in 2012. But history shows that economically shackled voters dump even war-winning leaders. Remember Churchill and Bush Senior?
Yet, Obama chose to identify Osama as the victim barely six hours after his killing, although flying his blood sample to the US for DNA testing alone would have taken longer, and then he barred the release of the photos of Osama's body, and the film of the assault on Osama that Obama was shown watching live in Washington. Later, Panetta admitted that the video link failed before the Navy Seals got into Osama's compound.
Osama was unarmed and offered no resistance. Yet the US Attorney General called his killing "lawful" and "consistent" with US values. Jubilant US allies didn't ask why Osama wasn't captured alive, why his face was targeted, and why his body was dumped into the sea without the Kabul-based Nato commanders seeing it. That's no surprise; when the time comes, Britain, France, Italy and Denmark would do the same to Qadhafi.
Besides President Obama, only an al Qaeda website (dubbed doubtful by the Taliban), confirmed Osama's death. Some coincidence! But rumour has it that Osama's residence was a CIA sanctuary, and so, was exempt from surveillance by the ISI, and the man killed there was an Osama look-alike. Osama died long ago.
His look-alike was planted close to the Kakul Academy to project Pakistan as a terrorist-protective state to label it unfit for owning nuclear weapons, and legalise a future intervention to take them out, which is what the US Senators are now demanding. Dubbing Osama's residence al Qaeda's command and control centre bolsters this claim.
The Pak Army's initial response to the attack was that such an "unauthorised unilateral action" can't become a "rule" or a "precedent for any state including the US." Such actions undermine co-operation and "may" constitute a threat to international peace and security - a view later seconded by UN's Human Rights Commission.
The family and servants of the 'supposed Osama' are in Pakistan's custody and may lay bare the truth. But by claiming that Osama is alive, will Pakistan get out of US shackles, or tighten them further and stall an Obama-desired US exit from this region? This choice may decide the 'truth' to be told.
In 2007, the US clubbed the ISI with 32 terrorist 'associate forces', described as "militant forces with which al Qaeda or the Taliban had an established working, supportive, or beneficiary relationship for achieving common goals." The list included the Haqqani group, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Iranian intelligence agencies. Now recall the cover of the October 29, 2007 issue of the Newsweek.
Recently, Adm. Mike Mullen had told the Pakistani media that the ISI had a "longstanding" relationship with the Haqqani Group which "is supporting, funding, or training fighters that are killing Americans and coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn't happen."
In this backdrop, a military official told Dawn "we had been looking for him [Osama] in no-go areas unaware that he was living close to an installation of ours; yes, it is an intelligence failure." Such lapses permit the likes of Panetta to claim that "either they [ISI operatives] were involved, or were incompetent."
The aerial surveillance lapse, whatever its profile, defies logic. Despite growing US violations of our borders, should the PAF radars be in a 'low position'? Has the US become friendlier? The massive increase in drone attacks, hundreds of CIA agents stalking our streets, America's open distrust of Pakistan, and predictions that General Petreaus could trap the US into invading Pakistan mandate a policy change.
Undoubtedly, the Osama saga damaged Pakistan's image because it followed the capture of many al Qaeda leaders from Pakistan - General Zia's legacy that wasn't undone by successive governments and the top brass of the Army, despite Pakistan being labelled a terrorist state after its 'use' in America's proxy war against the then USSR.
But going soft on terrorist outfits wasn't the way to retaliate against the visibly India-friendly US sanctions. These US-trained outfits could only destroy, not build, on foreign bidding; sheltering them has been a prolonged disaster that Pakistan continues to suffer from.
This policy made Pakistan the world's most dangerous state. Rationality demanded the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border and letting the Afghans settle their governance issues - a bit too much to expect from the likes of Ms Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, whose priority was settling personal scores, not uprooting terrorism.
I had suggested the fencing of the border to the Editor of The Economist in May 2007 and General Musharuff too demanded it in October 2007, but was asked (by you know who) to forget it. Fencing the border would have prevented Pakistan from eventually becoming fit for intervention - a possibility now. Befriending the US that believes in its Zionism-driven infallibility and its right to do just about anything was a blunder; such forces eventually perish via recessions caused by their invasions. So do their friends unless they part ways with them, which calls for vision and a prudent exit strategy - an urgency that we don't acknowledge.
Sadly, in an article in the Washington Post, President Zardari reflected his 'vision' by claiming that "in 1989 he [Osama] poured $50 million into a no-confidence vote [by PML-N] to topple her [Ms Bhutto's] first government," and went on to promise Pakistan's 'unqualified' support to the US in its war on terror.
Over the years, minimal disclosures about the origin of arms, ammunition and technology used in scores of terrorist acts in Pakistan (that let our enemies escape blame) shook the nation's confidence; the military high command's unclear resolve for sole-searching and accountability over the Abbottabad saga has shattered it. That confidence won't be restored until the Army high command declares a more emphatic policy than the one announced on May 5, on hunting terrorists, and future co-operation with the US. Since President Zardari can't go beyond maligning his political adversaries, the COAS must issue such a declaration, and quickly.
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