Some forty-two months ago, the February 2008 elections turned a new page in Pakistan's existential career. It heralded the demise of the ancient regime, and the birth of a democratic order. The elections yielded the emergence of two major parties - those that had ruled Pakistan for some eleven years (1988-99) before the military take-over.
This became possible because the elections, despite the dooms day analysts' prognostication, were yet remarkably free and fair. And that fortuitously spared Pakistan a re-enactment of the nightmarish, marathon PNA agitation, which was provoked by the rigged March 1977 elections. That agitation and both the December 1970 and the February 2008 elections proclaimed two core fundamental facts of Pakistan's body politic. First, whatever the rulers think, plan and strategize, the masses stolidly stand for unadulterated democracy and are in quest of it. Second, they have the initiative, the resiliency, and the determination to renew and resume the quest, despite long spells of suspension, caused by military interventions and civilian authoritarianism (remember Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's penchant for an animus dominando role and Nawaz Sharif's for an amirul momineen mantle) and to make the transition from authoritarianism to a democratic dispensation smooth and peaceful.
Although the elections, while confirming Pakistan's till towards a two-party system, developed during the 1990s, and despite the PPP emerging more as a national party than ever before, yet returned a hung parliament. But thanks to the equation developed between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during the eight year long foul weather, the PPP and the PML-N, fortuitously, decided upon a two-party coalition. This they did at Murree in mid-March, and the Murree compact had enabled them to cobble together a huge majority, facilitating the swearing in of the Yusuf Raza Gilani government on March 25.
In perspective, Asif Ali Zardari's reconciliation stance had paid off huge dividends, not only at the centre, but in the provinces as well. It enabled him not only to co-opt the ANP and even the JUI-F at the centre and in the two western provinces, but also the MQM in Sindh. In terms of ground realities, the latter's co-option and AZ's visit to the MQM's headquarters at Nine-Zero must be termed constructive. Constructive for the simple reason that without MQM's active co-operation, urban Sindh, the restive but the most productive segment in terms of financial resources and contribution to the central exchequer, would have remained barely represented in the province at its best and hostage to MQM's erratic politics at its worst. At any rate, the coalitional approach had made it possible to set up a stable government at the centre, viable coalitions in the NWFP (now KP), Balochistan and Sindh, and a PML-N dominated government in the Punjab, with PPP's active participation. Eight years of political wilderness had obviously diluted the measure of vengefulness between the two main parties, goading them pragmatically towards a smooth transition, and raising hopes to a point that a noted columnist Khaled Ahmed remarked that "If the PPP and PML-N can pull together in double harness for five years, Pakistan will settle down with a bipartisan system no longer tempted to booby trap itself periodically to strengthen the 'third party' in the centre".
But, tragically though, that hope still seems a little far fetched, in the light of subsequent developments. However, despite the judicial issue and despite the PML-N walking out of the centre early in May 2008, and despite periodical hiccups and verbal assaults, the "understanding" is still outwardly intact at the centre, though not in the Punjab, where the PPP coalition partners were shown the door in early 2011.
Since May 2008, the restoration of the pre-November 3 judiciary provided the battlefield and the testing ground for the two weather beaten PPP and PML-N strongmen. Thus, though still bound by the Charter of Democracy compact and though exuding broad smiles at their periodic meetings for the benefit of a gullible public, both AZ and MNS have yet been routinely and religiously following and seeking to advance their respective personal and political agendas. Not only they were (and are) asymmetrical. Both were also striving for high stakes. If one ingeniously took cover behind a systems approach, arguing for a constitutional mechanism, the other flaunted a high moral ground, insisting upon a quick-fix executive-order route for immediate judicial redressal and restoration, come hell and high water. AZ seemed reasonable: be sounded pragmatic and open ended, out for negotiations and bargaining. In contrast, MNS was strident and inflexible. But since politics is the art of the possible, as laid down by Bismarck, though verbally adamant, both were still flexible.
At has best, MNS was out to stake for Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry's restoration. A restoration which may facilitate the restored Chief Justice declare all post-November 3 acts and ordinances null and void, besides reopening the controversial NRO. With MNS, having vastly enhanced his vote bank, especially in the Punjab, by cashing in on the snowballing anti-Musharraf wave, the mid-term elections, it was surmised, might as well smile on MNS's fortunes. And all this at the expense of the PPP, its coalition partner. No wonder, the latter, forstalling the imminent danger to its prevailing predominance, had sent in its sentinel to the Governor House at Lahore, without even sounding out to its much hyped coalition partner. Thus, for now, Salman Taseer literally held the sword of Damocles over the provincial PML-N government, so that the PML-N's moves and counter moves could be countered effectively and in good time, and, any future mischief to rock the PPP's boat at the centre was thwarted. Salman Taseer had gone a step further: he had turned the Governor House into an alternative power-centre in the province and the hub of PPP jiyalas, workers and sympathisers, raising the ante a notch higher against the solo PML-N provincial government, and inflicting another dastardly stab in the post-February fragile democratic edifice.
The second PPP's major move against the PML-N came in February 2009 when Governor's rule was imposed in the Punjab without rhyme or reason, and the assembly was suspended. The constitutional solution in the wake of the court's decision on Shahbaz Sharif was to call a session of the assembly and get a new leader elected. Instead, the Governor, obviously in consultation with, if not instructions from, the centre, went in for an overkill: scuttling the PML-N, in an adroit move to deny it the option of putting its house in order and elect a new leader to head PML-N ministry. This drastic action inevitably pushed the two major parties on the war path, with the Sharif brothers addressing huge concourses of people and the PML-N activists going beresk, accusing Zardari of bad faith and "evil" designs and destroying PPP hoardings in almost all the nooks and corners of the sprawling province. For now, the velvet gloves were thrown aside, with the iron fists unsheathed, standing bare and naked. Simultaneously, the Governor, who had brazenly turned himself into a die-hard PPP jiyala, went in for the wheeling-dealing game, in order to manufacture a non-PML(N) majority to form the government. He held prolonged parleys with the PML(Q) leadership for some six weeks but Chaudhry Shujaat Husain and Pervez Illahi, assisted by Mashahid Husain Syed, the brain behind the PML-Q, were sane enough to see through the game, and refused to walk into Taseer's parlour. Taseer tried extremely hard to get an alternative coalition installed but he failed finally and miserably, more so because of the PML-N switch on the judiciary restoration issue and the success of the Long March in favour of judiciary restoration.
This anticipates, however. In the wake of the Governor's rule, the PML-N refused to sit as lame duck, to be picked up and slaughtered at will. Besides noisy and impressive demonstrations, which demonstrably pushed Shahbaz Sharif into a prime leadership role, the PML-N riposte came in the radical shift in its stance and role on the judiciary restoration issue. From mere verbal advocacy for a year and more, it switched over to agitation, to flexing its muscles, to mobilising its street power, and to a much publicized and a more organised Long March. It mobilised the masses throughout the province as never before, and threw its massive street power behind the black coats who had been agitating for restoration since November 3, 2007.
The PPP had reneged more than once on its promise to restore Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhry, and was still in no mood to get him restored, while relenting on other suspended judges. And the Zardari-Gilani regime, with Rahman Malik as the chief architect and operator of its policy and plan, put up all sorts of hurdles and hindrances to thwart the Long March. Islamabad was encased by hundred of containers, road blocks were set up on the approaches to the capital, and even plans to get the Jhelum bridge, which yields access to Islamabad, blown up were duly drawn up. The Long March, scheduled for March 15, 2009, was to start from Nawaz Sharif's Model town residence in Lahore, and despite all efforts, and a huge posse of Police surrounding his residence and its environs, he was still able to dodge them and lead the procession. And by the time he crossed the Ravi Bridge in the evening, hundreds of thousands of people along with their families had joined him. By then, the procession had assumed the character of a huge carnival.
Meantime, the American diplomats, from Washington to Islamabad, were busy in defusing what portended to be a huge developing crisis, with battle lines drawn between the government and the PML-N, backed by several million people all the way from Lahore to Islamabad. Also, the COAS's flat refusal to involve the armed forces in thwarting the March, as reported by some channels, played a clinching role. The government had no option but to surrender, and the COAS asked Nawaz Sharif to wait in Gujranwala, some fifty miles from Lahore, for the government's announcement. And it came in the wee hours of March 16. The Chief Justice alongwith other members of the suspended judiciary was restored, and Nawaz Sharif abandoned the Long March, as per the suggestions made to him.
All said and done, the Long March accomplished two things. First it restored the judiciary and made it almost invincible. Twenty-nine months down the road, it continues to be the dominant organ of the state, and haunts the Executive as nothing else does. Remember, how the Zardari-Gilani administration had to surrender on and de-notify the elevation of the Lahore Chief Justice to the apex court, and extend Justice Ramday's tenure, to save their face in March 2010. The PPP stalwarts have, oft and anon, claimed that the judiciary restoration was their handiwork, but one can't simply fool all the people all the time. The black coats had been agitating for their restoration for over sixteen months before the Long March and it was only Nawaz Sharif's joining the foray that had made all the difference. Hence the sole credit for the final restoration goes to Nawaz Sharif alone.
Second, the success of the Long March also made the PML-N invincible, so far as the Punjab was concerned. Three weeks after the March, the courts overturned the earlier decision on an appeal by Shahbaz Sharif, resulting in the withdrawal of the Governor's rule and Shahbaz's restoration as Chief Minister. Thus, the PPP's dream to "conquer" Punjab came to naught.
As indicated earlier, the elections had made possible the enthronement of a democratic dispensation after some nine years. As of now, Pakistan may be considered a functional democracy in terms of its external appurtenances like the assemblies, judiciary and a free press. But sadly missing is the critical variable - the democratic ethos, breathing the doings of politicians, executives, officials (including judicial) as well as the highly esteemed journalists and columnists, TV hosts, anchors and commentators.
The major constraints contributing to the continued languishing of democracy and keeping it in constant disarray are as follows: the lack of internal democracy within the political parties, the burgeoning trend towards founding political dynasties (in the PPP, PML-N, ANP, JUI-F, JUP, etc), turning political parties into embodiments of personality cults (as in the MQM), and, above all, the utter lack of accountability at all levels. Democracy, like charity, must begin at home, and unless the parties themselves practice democracy and subscribe to democratic norms in running their affairs and filling in party posts, their calls for democracy are, ab initio and ipso facto, brazenly hallow and hypocritical.
Fortunately, Pakistan now claims to have a free press, one of the critical determinants of a democratic culture and a democratic dispensation. The proliferation of the electronic media has inevitably brought political awareness to the threshold of even hamlets. That in turn devolves a great deal of responsibility on the media, especially the electronic segment, in promoting a democratic culture and strengthening democratic ethos. However, some of the TV anchors and commentators have gone in for the short cut: to rank sensationalism to gain wider audiences, to increase their respective channels' market ratings and advertising, and in the process earn a burgeoning personal dividend - professional and social upgradation a la Hobbes' Leviathan, as some of the columnists have recently pointed out in several newspapers. (Remember, the skewed trenchant comments and rhetoric had, after all, landed a former ARY and GEO anchor in the most enviable and comfortable slot in the official channel.) Are they using the media as instruments of public - as opposed to individual - will and interest, as laid down by the Social Responsibility theory and the (Hutchinson) Commission on the Press (1947) (A Free and Responsible Press: Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947)? The press is expected to serve as a watchdog, and unless the columnists and commentators bend their preferences and prejudices to conform to normative democratic prerequisites and behaviour, they fail to promote the democratic process and public enlightenment. To quote Rifaat Jafri (letter, Dawn, 28 August 2008, p. 6) "... I was dismayed to witness most anchors on our various TV channels disconnecting callers who expressed their disappointment at his [Musharraf's] resignation", And so far as these fault lines are not straightened out, Pakistan will continue to be in quest of a democratic culture and milieu, despite formal democratic structures.
Why? Because if esteemed columnists of the like of Irfan Husain and Rasul Bux Rais applaud and justify "bloodline" succession and politics, what hope is there for the development and growth of a democratic political culture? When Ayaz Ameer lauds Hafiz el-Assad of Syria to the high skies, as he did in Dawn on his death a decade ago, what credibility could his plea for genuine democracy, which he had been making for over two decades, command? When Asma Jahangir brazenly declares that she would resort to "horse trading" and lotaism to "create" a majority in the Senate, in Hameed Haroon's imaginatively conceived and brilliantly produced Reality Show entitled "Enter the PM" on the DAWNNEWS in February 2008, how could democratic norms become routinized in this country? When Qazi Faez Isa, in the same programme, dismisses with high disdain Shafqat Shah Jamote's reference to the notorious attack on the Supreme Court during MNS's second regime in November 1997, arguing that it had had little consequences, what is the message he is trying to convey: that the ethicality of an action is not enmeshed with what propels its enactment in the first place, but depends solely on its consequences? Such instances from recent comments and observations can be multiplied ad infinitum, but these will suffice for the moment. These in turn unmistakeably indicate that while we all plead for and advocate democracy routinely and all the time yet we are not informed and guided by a democratic ethos.
Thus, for the time being, the democratic structure, whether functional or dysfunctional, is very much in place, but without its life giving and energizing soul - the normative democratic ethos. And that can be retrieved, redeemed or repossessed only and only when the relevant societal starta not only decides, but also helps, substantially and consistently, to establish a democratic milieu. Hence, for now, although the democratic façade is very much there in all its imposing dominance, the quest, the eternal quest for a democratic ethos continues to be inextricably trapped in a quagmire of soaring personal ambitions, the political parties' partisan interests and agendas, the officials' calculated opportunism and a good many of the nascent crop of the inexplicably socially elevated electronic anchors' and commentators' inexorable drive for upward professional and market ratings, with scant regard to its consequences: whether it conforms to or distorts Milton's "free marketplace of ideas". - (Sharif al Mujahid, HEC Distinguished National Professor, has recently co-edited Unesco's History of Humanity, vol. VI, and The Jinnah Anthology (2010) and edited In Quest of Jinnah (2007), the only oral history on Pakistan's founding father.
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