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pak_usWhosoever had expected extensive fireworks during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Islamabad was certainly disappointed; none of it happened. In fact, her visit helped dispel quite a chunk of misunderstandings and misgivings besetting the Pak-US bilateralism since the May 2 raid on the Osama compound, and, perhaps unwittingly, intensified by Admiral Mike Mullen's outlandish comment dubbing ISI a "veritable arm" of the Haqqani network. Given that even the best of bilateral relationship doesn't mean compromising basic national interests by the partners, the meetings in Islamabad couldn't clinch unanimity of their views between the two sides, but what they did agree to was no mean achievement. On its part, the US delegation accepted the hosts' position against 'foreign boots' on their soil, agreed to holding peace talks with the Taliban and acknowledged its failure to stop Afghanistan-based Pakistani Taliban from carrying out forays into Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan accepted the presence of 'safe havens' on its soil and promised action against the Haqqani fighters on its own and volunteered to promote the intra-Afghan reconciliation process. How to go about operationalizing the peace parleys with the Taliban, that is now under discussion between the three - the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, under the fondly called 'tri-logue'. All that fuss now being kicked up - some of it by misquoting the American leaders and some by misinterpreting their statements and media comments. It seems to be work of the forces who are not ready to countenance Pakistan's presence as a peacemaker in Afghanistan. But having said that it would be naïve to claim that the entire trust deficit that is troubling the Pak-US partnership since early this year, has been taken care of and complete unanimity permeates their anti-terror alliance now. That devil resides in the detail becomes clear when their public announcements are re-read in the light of nuances that abounded in the media encounters of both Foreign Minister Khar and Secretary Clinton. When Secretary Clinton wants both talk and fight with the Afghan insurgents she tends to suggest that the US-led coalition forces would like a beaten and defeated Taliban come to the negotiating table. Then she talks of redlines which essentially mean that before coming to the table the Afghan insurgents must accord legitimacy to the foreign military presence with all its consequences. Interestingly, and perhaps intriguingly, the Americans want separate talks with the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban, which does raise some legitimate doubts about their sincerity as some think the move is intended for dividing the Afghan resistance. It's no wonder then the Haqqani network has rejected separate talks, insisting the US would not find a solution to the Afghan conflict "until and unless they hold talks with the Taliban shura." When you say the Afghan peace process has to be "Afghan-led and has to be at the pace and scope that the Afghans decide on" then it has to be the 'all-Afghans-led', and not merely in the framework fixed by the Karzai government. As to what the Americans think of Islamabad's position on their insistence to 'squeeze' the Haqqani militants there is some confusion that needs to be cleared. Foreign Minister Khar had made clear that it's Pakistan's parliament, and not the GHQ, which would decide if the situation in North Waziristan Agency warranted a military operation and if so, it would order accordingly. For them, familiar as they are with the pattern set by General Musharraf when the GHQ called all the shots, this is a changed position, and not that suits the US game-plan. Obviously, the State Department and Pakistan are not on the same page as regards the 'redlines' fixed by the Kabul administration, the fundamental mismatch stemming from the fact that while Washington seeks peace in Afghanistan through the barrel of gun, Islamabad is for peace through unconditional participation of all factions of Afghan society. So, even when the Pak-US anti-terror alliance has largely moved out of the shadow of distrust and misgivings, a lot needs to be done yet by fine-tuning their positions which get blurred as often by the conflicting statements of the American politicians as frequently by US officials' misquoted remarks. Copyright Business Recorder, 2011

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