Whether the glass is half empty or half full, the Pakistan-India talks on conventional and nuclear weapons confidence-building measures (CBMs) held in Islamabad this week failed to offer a clear reply to this question. The two-day expert level talks moved both ways. While it showed clear move in certain areas in some others it copiously projected Indian intransigence by sticking to the status quo. First, the talks - which in their present format are essentially recommendatory - succeeded in agreeing to extend by five years the two existing accords, namely pre-notification of ballistic missile tests and reducing the risk of nuclear accidents. Given the high lethality of nuclear weapons, used or misused, the extension of these accords, now to be finalised at the secretary-level, is certainly a positive move, and will help strengthen the imperative of cutting out the abounding trust-deficit between the two countries. That the interlocutors also discussed Pakistan's proposal that India move away its heavy guns from the Line of Control in Kashmir, the efficacy of maintaining hot line between their foreign secretaries and advance notification of military exercises in the framework of their security concepts and nuclear doctrines - the talks after considerable hiatus justify the need for a continuing contact between the two. But where the two sides failed to agree is no less critical; India rejected outright Pakistan's proposal for a Strategic Nuclear Restraint Regime, keeping up its lasting resistance to Pakistan's concept of declaring South Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. On the other hand, it insists that Pakistan should pledge no-first use of nuclear weapons, which is not possible unless and until an overarching environment of peace and tranquillity is obtained in South Asia, wherein the nuclear option becomes redundant. That's not the case yet. The outcome of the bilateral CBMs talks remains unclear also for India's manifest effort at breaking out of the nuclear equation in South Asia - by trying to restrict and undermine Pakistan's nuclear option, mainly by seeking international acquiesce to its nuclear-power status despite being out of the NPT ambit, particularly of the West where it projects itself as a bulwark against China's mushrooming politico-military power in the region. And that bait has been bitten by quite a few; of late by Australia. After the United States jumped the line by making the so-called civilian nuclear deal with India in utter violation of the NPT, the new Australian government too has agreed to supply uranium to feed Indian nuclear reactors quite a few of which are geared to enrich the mineral to weapon-grade strength - while the Suppliers Group looks the other way. But this is a losing game; there is no such thing as Pakistan giving up its nuclear option given the mismatch of conventional capabilities of the two. It was India's "Smiling Buddha" atomic tests in 1974 which forced Pakistan out of its 'recessed deterrence' and put it on the road to nuclearised security option that it did by conducting the tit-for-tat explosions at Chaghi. As the nuclear genie is out of the bottle in South Asia the next realistic move should be to secure its use by various means. Of course, a nuclear-free world should be the lingering dream of everyone, but as long as it doesn't happen, and seems impossible any time soon no effort should be spared to ensure its security against misuse and mishap. Its unintended use is the most dangerous situation; both Pakistan and India have to make sure it doesn't happen. The present practice of exchanging nuclear lists is certainly an important CBM, as is their agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities mentioned in the lists. It is important that the scope of this agreement is expanded to cater for new acquisitions and technological progress in related fields. Irrespective of the size of their arsenals, their nuclear capabilities place Pakistan and India in the same equation. Yes, nuclear is a lethal weapon but the fact cannot be overlooked that these weapons of war are, paradoxically, also instruments of peace, as much in South Asia as in Europe and rest of the world. Undoubtedly, a clear understanding between Pakistan and India on their nuclear capabilities by strengthening the CBMs regime would strength the environments for peace in the region. But for this, India has to come forward more openly and willingly. Copyright Business Recorder, 2011
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