PCNS recommendations

Foreign policy formulation is essentially a responsibility of the government. That it should, by and large, reflect the ethos of the nation as articulated by the parliament helps in its implementation. But in this case, the PPP-led government passed the buck to the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS), perhaps more as a tactic to shift its exclusive but onerous duty in these trying times by asking the parliamentary opposition to share its burden. So now that the ground realities have undergone substantial changes since the Salala checkpost episode in November last year, the opposition finds it convenient to withdraw its support of the PCNS recommendations that it had earlier given. But is hardly the reason to belittle this path-breaking achievement on the part of the parliament which for so long had watched the game from the sidelines. Whatever the motivation behind this game-changer, it is for the first time that the people's elected representatives have been taken into complete confidence by the Establishment. The PCNS has only defined the board contours of the national ambitions and aspirations, and how to, and to what extent, these can be shaped into a realistic foreign policy; the ball is back in the government's court. Of course, quite a few of the recommendations were beyond the scope of the terms of reference for the parliamentary take on the subject matter and bordered more on the broader foreign policy areas. But then it had to figure in as part of the recommendations, for there is a wide perceptional gap besetting the people's expectations and their realisation in terms of concrete action. In fact, the delay in presentation of the PCNS recommendations to the joint session of the parliament, irrespective of this being deliberate or unavoidable, has helped clear the ground for their adoption by the government. By now quite a few roadblocks have been removed and the other side; the United States, Nato and Isaf collectively and individually, seem quite willing to move forward in jointly fighting the war on terrorism. Both sides now have better comprehension of each other's positions thanks to active behind the scenes interlocution at the diplomatic and military levels. Meanwhile, the Afghan scenario has undergone dramatic changes in the wake of incidents like the holy Quran burning; the wanton killing spree; the Afghan soldiers' deadly attacks on their foreign colleagues and above all the growing war fatigue that tends to force the US-led coalition partners to reappraise their positions. That they would like to shift their goalposts is very much expected. Certainly then the debate on the PCNS guidelines in the joint session sittings are expected to be realistic in terms of aspirations and pragmatic in terms of implementation. How would the US government react to the final stand by the Pakistani parliament cannot be predicted with certainty, and will not be available until the recommendations take the shape of a clearly spelled-out government position. But if the recent developments on the war front are any guide, there is every possibility of clinching the agreement on most of the recommendations, except for the two - drone strikes and an "unconditional apology from the US government". In fact, on the latter there is a shift from Pakistan's earlier stand that this apology must come from President Obama. But that call has now been diluted rightly realising that in this election year President Obama would find it difficult to do so. Should the United States agree to sharing operational aspect of drone attacks in terms of acting in tandem against terrorist hideouts, if any on Pakistani soil, a solution to this complicated issue can be found. At this stage, however, the ball is in the parliament's court and it has to play it seriously and dispassionately. It may sound unpatriotic to some quarters and people, but the fact remains that in the broader context a healthy, mutually beneficial Pak-US relationship is of crucial importance both to Islamabad and Washington. No doubt the initial US government's reaction could only be as much as it was, and that's not negative, but it has to ensure that its typical ifs and buts do not obstruct progress. For a fuller revival of bilateralism in the war against terrorism and extremism, Pakistan's region-specific national interests may have to be re-defined. New terms of engagement, which cannot be as open-ended as General Musharraf had agreed, have to be settled and hermetically stuck to by both sides. And this is doable.