A day before commemorating India's illegal annexation of the even-otherwise occupied Kashmir, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan, unveiled Pakistan's new political map. Through the new map, Pakistan vociferously reiterated and articulated its claim on Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK).
On the occasion and during his subsequent address to lawmakers of Azad Kashmir, the Prime Minister, in no uncertain terms, vowed to fight for the Kashmiris at all fora. This was commensurate with Pakistan's state position of extending support to the Kashmiris in their struggle for freedom via exercising their right to self-determination - something that was promised to them by the United Nations Security Council. That Pakistan has deliberately chosen neither to use force nor to threaten India with war is construed by some as a sign of weakness and resignation. Voices critical of the government have time and again berated Khan and his team for allegedly leaving the Kashmiris in the lurch and not doing enough.
Criticism notwithstanding, three things need to be brought to light in a bid to understand Pakistan's Kashmir policy and as to why, given the circumstances, it is part of the course.
One, Pakistan was and is not in any position to stop India from tinkering with its Constitution, however brazen or illegal those changes might be. In other words, Pakistan had no mechanism to practically deter India from taking unilateral decisions of revoking IIOJK’s so-called autonomy. At the most, Pakistan could have warned the world of the impending disaster. It did so on more than one occasion before India's August 5 actions.
Two, Pakistan never accepted the validity of Article 370, yet it did not choose to remain silent once the very Article was annulled. Seeing an opportunity to pin India down, Pakistan shifted gears in its diplomacy on Kashmir, and, led by the Prime Minister, highlighted, with a fair degree of success, the plight of the Kashmiris. As of today, India, despite being a strategic bedfellow of powers that be, is being flayed and questioned on its approach in II0JK. This could not have happened without the concerted efforts of Pakistan. It is noteworthy that Pakistani officials have linked regional peace, stability, and prosperity to the just settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Three, Pakistan was and still is faced with a host of issues, ranging from economic crises, terrorism, and cumbersome foreign debts. If all this were not challenging enough, the COVID-19 pandemic made matters worse. Regardless, Pakistan has utilized every conduit to not only broach the subject of Kashmir but has thoroughly exposed India’s colonization project in II0JK.
With all this in mind, it is befitting to deconstruct the criticism on Pakistan’s approach in dealing with the situation that has unfolded post -August 5. It is argued that Pakistan has ‘sold’ and ‘given up’ on Kashmir. The argument does not sit well with the facts on the ground. The issue is back on the forefront when it comes to Pakistan’s official and semi-official interactions with the international community. It is worth recalling that, Pakistan had very recently called upon its principal ally, Saudi Arabia to ‘do-more' on and for Kashmir, an act that is full of risks, given the vagaries of Middle Eastern politics and politicos. Moreover, Pakistan has taken up the cause of Kashmir at the highest, most-relevant forum: the United Nations Security Council, with the help of its ally, China. Kashmir and the Kashmiris top the list of Pakistan’s vital national interests, something that runs against the ‘abandonment refrain'.
The most forceful reason given to support the assertion of Pakistan’s disinterest in resolving the Kashmir issue is Pakistan’s reticence to use the kinetic option against India. There are many aspects to take into account here. First, the threat of escalation of hostilities is a veritable one. The use of force to achieve compellence under a bilateral deterrence framework is but akin to playing with fire. Second, can Pakistan sustain a war, given its feeble economy? Third, can it achieve political ends through the application of force? Fourth, can escalation be controlled bilaterally, and if not, would third-parties terminate a crisis in a way that suits Pakistan and the Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control?
Applying Graham Allison’s Rational-Actor Model here would be useful. The problem at hand is how to help Kashmiris exercise their right to self-determination and break the shackles of Indian occupation. To use force is one of the options available to Pakistan. While the costs could range from sanctions to unremitting nuclear escalation, the benefits would be next to nothing.
The first casualty of a military conflict with nuclear underpinnings with India would be the very people Pakistan has resolved to protect: Kashmiris. All this and other calculations go into Pakistan’s policy of restraint. Not going on a warpath is not a corollary of its unwillingness to go the extra mile for the Kashmiris. It would be prudent to say that Pakistan has not, by any means abandoned Kashmir, and is very much committed to continuing its rightful and legitimate support to the Kashmiris.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2020
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of his organization.
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is a Research Associate at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore. He is also the Associate Editor of Pakistan Politico, the country’s first strategic and foreign affairs magazine. He is also teaching undergraduate courses on Foreign Policy and National Security. He has been working in the think tank circuit for the past 4 years. His research interest lie in nuclear deterrence, military strategy, and the geopolitics of South Asia. He regularly contributes to premier dailies.
Comments
Comments are closed.