ISLAMABAD: The federal capital is abuzz with speculation that Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Power and Petroleum Tabish Gauhar will be shown the door for allegedly failing to deal with the recent energy crisis which earned a bad name for the government, well informed sources told Business Recorder.
The decision makers, sources said, have already begun contacting some experienced energy sector personnel to offer them the position of SAPM.
Sources said Tabish Gauhar is on the defensive these days, especially after his negative remarks about the CPEC projects in Karachi, which led to a rebuttal from National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in that NAB would seek a clarification from him after seeing the video of his address at Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) head office, Karachi.
Tabish Gauhar left for Dubai from Karachi after his address at FPCCI where he spent a few days but has returned since.
An insider told Business Recorder that he was on leave for a few days and went to see his family in the emirate as he had not visited them on Eidul Fitr.
Another official claimed that Tabish Gauhar is no longer the main decision-maker after Minister for Energy Hammad Azhar began to take decisions.
Earlier, Nadeem Babar, SAPM on Petroleum, Secretary Petroleum and some other senior officials were removed for being responsible for the petrol crisis early this year.
Meanwhile, the Azam Swati-led Committee constituted by the Cabinet Committee on Energy (CCoE) to probe recent energy crisis, has framed 29 questions and sent to the Ministry of Energy for answers.
The questions are as follows: (i) when was the first time Engro EETPL (or its FSRU supplier Excelerate) notified MoE that it wanted to replace the FSRU? (ii) Under the agreements with Engro, who is the counterparty that Engro coordinates with from contractual point of view, and from operational point of view? (iii) Did MoE ever formally request to delay the dry docking, and if so, why? (iv) Why was FSRU not sent for dry docking in 2020, if it was not MoE asking them to delay? (v) When did MoE Petroleum Division find out about dry docking planning at the end of June 2021? (vi) Once MoE Petroleum Division found about dry docking at this time, what actions did it take? (vii) Who makes the decisions and arrangements relating to gas, LNG and RFO supplies to power sector? (viii) When was power division informed about dry docking taking place by June 30, 2021? (ix) Who deals with policy matters related to gas/LNG in Petroleum Division (chain)? (x) Is SEQUOIA taken as alternate or bridging ship what are the protocols and procedures of commissioning an alternate ship and if, for some reasons it is not sailing back and replaced by dry docked ship Exquisite how much time is needed to perform requisite inspections, what will be arrangements to check any other pause in supply chain of LNG? (xi) What is the chain of correspondence from terminals to MoE? (xii) Is there any provision of increasing output of focal gas fields and has it ever happened in the past? (xiii) Who manages and operates gas fields Kunner Pysaki and Qadir Pur? (xiv) Who does contingency planning of LNG/RFO/LSFO and when were all fuels calculated? Who supervised that? When was last coordination meeting of fuel calculations held and who chaired it? Were fuel stocks at Kapco, Muzaffargarh, Jamshoro and Hubco complete for summer peak season (June, July)? (xv) Submit data of all refineries’ production, inventory and sale from April 2020 to June 2021; (xvi) When did Power Division submit their demand to Petroleum Division for gas/LNG and RFO for power generation? (xvii) When did present Secretary Petroleum and SAPM Petroleum took charge of their positions? (xviii) When did Petroleum Division first time formally received deadline date for dry docking and from whom, when did SAPM, Secretary Petroleum and additional Secretary Petroleum receive information and what sequence of actions were taken? (xix) When was summary for TPA approved by Cabinet? Why has it not been implemented so far? What are hindrances and why is private sector struggling to utilise government’s unutilised capacity and available capacity in existing terminal? Had magnitude of crisis been lower, then it happened if MoE had timely allowed private LNG import? (xx) How many times dry docking was postponed and what were the reasons? Were those based on facts or assumptions and what efforts were made since EETPL first correspondence with Petroleum Division/SSGCL on 23/1/19 to ensure dry docking to take place at a point of time which suits government interests? (xxi) When was the MoE-Power Division officially informed by MoE-Petroleum Division that dry docking will result in drastic reduction of RLNG supply to power sector? (xxii) What did the MoE-Petroleum Division do as contingency planning to keep supplying necessary fuels to the Power Division at peak generation time during dry docking? (xxiii) Was SAPM for Power and Petroleum coordinating among both Divisions on this issue of dry docking and was it in writing or verbal and to provide record of meetings including attendance. When was it realised that dry docking will create a crisis situation for energy, industry, fertilizer and CNG. Was it avoidable? (xxiv) Had PSO ever informed Petroleum Division regarding any shortage of furnace oil during June and July 2021. If yes, when, to whom and how, and to provide record? (xxv) Who decides to divert or reschedule any LNG cargo if needed. What is the procedure? (xxvi) Is there any mechanism to ensure purchase of LNG at cheaper rates, who ensures and overlooks this aspect? If yes, then why spot buying by PLL and PSO at short notices and extremely high rates is not checked which ultimately is adding to circular debt? (xxvi) As per agreement clause 13.3.2 it is customer’s prerogative to agree to change in annual programme, who decides and approve this? Why was it agreed in this case? If not then who forced to allow dry docking despite so many contractual violations? Will loss occurred to national exchequer be recovered from operator EETPL? (xxviii) Violation of contractual clause 13.1.3 caused a huge loss to the national exchequer - Is there a provision to impose any LDS on violators? (xxix) Were considerations ever made during various deliberations with concerned stakeholders regarding the economic impact dry docking would have towards energy and gas sector as a result of being high peak consumption time of the year? If so, please specify which meeting or correspondences highlighted these facts.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2021
Comments
Comments are closed.