The collapse of the Afghan government’s military and security forces in the face of the Taliban offensive in motion since May 2021 is not a surprise. What is confounding for most people is the speed and suddenness of the collapse. People are left wondering why an army and security forces built by the US with expenditure of $ 83 billion, the latest weapons, supplies and training over 20 years could melt away virtually without firing a shot.
The answer lies not in the sophisticated weaponry and equipment or numbers of the Afghan military. After all the balance of forces in the field was 300,000 Afghan military contending against some 80,000 insurgent Taliban equipped largely with small arms. The real reason the Afghan military collapsed in such rapid and dramatic fashion within literally weeks or months is the age-old military wisdom culled from experience. A larger, more heavily armed force can be defeated by a smaller, less equipped one if the former lacks morale, will, belief in the cause it is ostensibly fighting for, commitment and discipline.
On all these counts, the Afghan army was badly lacking. Reports after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, signalling their complete control over the country, speak of the strategy pursued by the Taliban in their final blitz. First, they nibbled away at isolated military posts and captured important border crossing points. The inability of the Afghan government to provide logistical support or reinforcements to these areas sent a strong signal through the ranks of the Afghan government soldiery that they were on their own. Often short of food, ammunition, air support and reinforcements anyway, many considered whether it was worth dying for a dubious cause, that of Ashraf Ghani’s government. Not only that government, even the ranks of the Afghan army were riddled with corruption and inefficiency, dealing a devastating blow to morale over the years and long before the Taliban launched their final offensive.
Reports also speak of a subtle, backdoor channel opened up by regional Taliban commanders in the north and west of the country, areas ethnically non-Pashtun and which continued armed resistance against the last Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001, to persuade the already demoralised defenders not to throw away their lives for no good cause. Such channels were reportedly even in existence with seemingly hardline anti-Taliban elements in the Ashraf Ghani government. These reports help explain why many soldiers surrendered or fled to adjoining countries rather than confront the advancing Taliban. It also may help explain the Taliban’s peaceful entry into Kabul, thereby avoiding the potential bloodbath used by a fleeing Ashraf Ghani as his mea culpa. That has not washed with members of his own government, who have accused him of betraying his people by abandoning them to their own fate in order to save his own skin. Ashraf Ghani’s family is already reportedly in the US, and no doubt he will be joining them from Tajikistan where he has reportedly fled with close aides.
The Taliban victory has been in plain sight for long, especially after former US President Donald Trump signed a US/NATO forces withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in Doha. That agreement basically worked in the US’s interest, weary of what had been termed ‘the forever war’. However, it threw the Ashraf Ghani government and the Afghan people to the wolves (the Taliban). The insurgents have developed over time a sophisticated narrative aimed at reassuring the world that they have learnt from their past mistakes and adopted a more ‘inclusive’ posture. This narrative is aimed at demolishing whatever remains of resistance because of fear of the past harsh hardline attitudes of the Taliban in 1996-2001. It appears ever so rational, objective, and acceptable. Apart from wearing down residual fear and resistance, the narrative is also aimed at providing their regime legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the world. This is critical since governing a war-devastated Afghanistan would require help, aid, and financial flows at a considerable level if the country is not to sink into more chaos. Any such development, i.e. the inability of the now installed Taliban government to govern in a manner that brings at least minimum succour to the long suffering Afghan people could fuel resistance.
Is there a likelihood of resistance now? The immediate reaction of the Afghan people appears to be a mixture of relief (that the Taliban takeover has occurred relatively peacefully) and fear (because of mistrust in the Taliban’s assurances of better behaviour towards women, ethnic minorities and past or future opponents). However, after the crumbling of the Afghan military and security forces, the ethnic minority militias too have suffered a mixed fate. Ismail Khan of Herat fame has been captured by the Taliban and apparently struck a deal that has allowed him to walk free, no doubt on guarantees of ‘good behaviour’. But Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Noor have fled the country and the Panjsher militia under the late Ahmed Shah Massoud’s son seems still to be in the field.
Nevertheless, it will take time even if the remaining resistance is to be revived. In the meantime, the Taliban’s policies and even more their implementation in practice will be closely watched by the US-led west in order to come to a conclusion on recognition of the Taliban regime, the key to economic survival of the fundamentalists’ government. Russia and China seem inclined to keep an open mind regarding the Taliban regime, more in the hope of staving off any Taliban encouragement to their respective areas of potential conflict than any love or admiration of the outfit. Moscow and Beijing hope thereby to diplomatically persuade the Taliban not to allow co-ethnic fundamentalist movements aimed at Central Asia (Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc) and Xinjiang (Uighurs) respectively to use their presence on Afghan soil against these neighbouring countries and regions.
As for Pakistan, widely accused of being the mainstay of the Taliban since 2001, the Taliban victory may turn out to be pyrrhic. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is already back in action at a low level that could rise. The Taliban’s reassuring and soothing noises may have stemmed any outward refugee flows towards Pakistan for the moment, but if a fresh civil war breaks out after some time to regroup, such a development cannot be ruled out, border fencing or no fencing.
And as a last word, one can only contemplate the wisdom of Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, whose needle is stuck in the groove of ‘there is no military solution in Afghanistan’. What is it then that has transpired there?
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Copyright Business Recorder, 2021
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