Politics of transition

As the people of Pakistan brace sufferings of sorts and confront the myriad of problems with its attendant consequences, the country completes sixty-five years of its existence. The ruling elite, the common man, the intellectuals, the business community, and the legal fraternity etc are getting increasingly sceptical about the future of the nation.
The existential threat is posed by external influences but more importantly by domestic factors injecting such deep pessimism that to be hopeful appears to be a luxury no one can afford. In these trying circumstances, the political mantra or the official narrative describes the current situation as a step towards 'transition to democracy'. This rhetoric is studded with expressions which claim that 'democracy is the last revenge', and that transition entails the prevailing problems and that these teething pains will fade away as the democratic dispensations mature in due course. Such claims are laudable and no one will dispute these noble ideas about democracy, the real situation obtaining in Pakistan is pregnant with issues that belie democratic claims.
While the movement towards transition to democracy is the professed belief and practice of the coalition political managers, they themselves are interestingly enough, ringing the alarm bells regularly, alleging that conspiracies are being hatched to derail the democratic process and 'powers that be' are obstructing the smooth transition. This places the ruling outfit as an agent of change and at the same time in a confrontational mode to take on these forces that hinder the paradigm shift in the governance model. Apparently, the dialectical interaction between democratic and authoritarian forces disguises more than it reveals. The ongoing contest between these two forces clearly highlights the conflict and the way it is fought out. Within the initiatives to revive democracy and supremacy of the Parliament, there is evidence of a streak of authoritarianism, which has historical antecedents.
Pakistan started its political journey having adopted the Government of India Act 1935 with minor amendments as its Constitution. This was an imperial document spelling out an authoritarian model of governance. Attempts to mould it in to a democratic setting failed and the 50s witnessed a period of Political instability because of the structural incompatibility with norms and practices of democracy. The authoritarian streak broadened and thickened with the Martial Law of 1958 and the Constitution of 1962 further reinforced it.
The 1973 consensus Constitution, though democratic, was operated in an authoritarian style. The personality cult under a charismatic Bhutto sought to establish what came to be known as the Bonapartist regime. Like most military dictators, Bhutto also attempted to bring superior judiciary under his control though the 6th and 7th amendments to the Constitution. Besides taking other centralising initiatives he seriously contemplated introducing a Presidential system and hence, the authoritarian style of governance persisted. Zia's regime continued this tradition under the Islamization rhetoric and by introducing the 8th amendment changed the complexion of the '73 Constitution. Eleven years of Zia's draconian rule further reinforced the centralising tendencies in the political system.
The interlude of the civilian governments from 1988-99 worked under a 'troika arrangement' that caused the dismissal of four governments in quick succession. This can also be interpreted as a tug of war between democratic and authoritarian forces.
Armed with the majority in Parliament, Nawaz Sharif scrapped the 8th Amendment. In a bid to tilt the balance of power in favour of civilian supremacy, Nawaz came up with the 14th Amendment which in fact meant a shift to an autocratic rule. It is ironic that the civilian leaders from Bhutto to Nawaz struggled to establish another kind of authoritarian rule. The attack on the Supreme Court building by the Muslim League supporters unleashed under the auspices of the party depicted the mindset of the rulers who wanted no checks on their arbitrary exercise of political power. Pervez Musharraf revived the Zia style of governance through the 17th Amendment and the superior judiciary went beyond their jurisdiction to allow the military ruler to amend the Constitution for a period of three years. The PCO judges touched the lowest ebb by giving powers to Musharraf which they in the first place were not competent to grant. Surely, this reveals the mind of the ruler who wanted to wield unbridled and unfettered authority.
In his quest to consolidate power, Musharraf had the unique distinction of imposing Martial Law twice, dismissing the entire superior judiciary and imprisoning the Chief Justice along with his colleagues under house arrest. The authoritarian way of ruling ran a full circle, triggering the lawyer's movement which eventually turned out to be his undoing.
The NRO driven recipe installed the present set-up through an electoral process, which was trumpeted as the restoration of democracy. The PPP-led governance held the coalition partners at all cost and in the name of pragmatism embraced even the PML (Q), which was originally placed in the NRO script to be a part of the new set-up. Nervous yet aggressive, the PPP initiatives were formed as a result of the politics of imaginary or real adversaries. Having played the role of opposition and confrontational politics, the orientation of the party remains in that habitual mode.
After coming to power in unusual and unsavoury circumstances, the PPP used the 'Reconciliation' rhetoric to club together coalition partners and allowed the PML (N) to rule Punjab. Whereas this approach has given dividends ensuring four and a half years of civilian rule, it has resultantly disappointed almost everyone. The governance model adopted by the present regime was indeed no more than the one practised by Musharraf. The authoritarian model characterised by the 17th Amendment continued for more than three years and theoretically through the 18th Amendment the '73 Constitution was restored with the Prime Minister as the Chief Executive, the governance model in practical terms remains the same as the President is the focal point of authority and calls all the shots. In the name of Parliamentary Supremacy, the democratic procedures and practices are bulldozed and even constitutional amendments are passed in a day or so without any meaningful debate. Is this the way to democratise the system or just a continuation of old practices that treat the Parliament as a rubber stamp?
The present stand-off between the executive and the judiciary is a manifestation of the continuing trend to monopolise power without checks and balances. The judicial activism can be seen and equated with the excesses and malpractices of the executive. As the superior judiciary has the power of the pen but is dependent on the executive for implementing its orders, the rulers are engaged in wilful defiance bordering on challenging the institution of judiciary which presses for the rule of law and constitutional governance. In its judgement of 31st July, the judiciary has blocked the way of Martial Law and did not invoke Article 190 of the Constitution despite the provocation and lack of compliance by the executive.
Even frivolous issues are venomously injected in the ongoing political narrative to create mayhem clouding the visibility of the real issues. An acute form of bad governance and rampant corruption is hidden or sidelined behind the smoke screen of these frolics. One such issue is the role of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution. Judicial Review is an accepted principle in written constitutions and across the border the Indian Supreme Court has even struck down constitutional amendments. Even in the mother democracy, with an unwritten Constitution, a recent shift away from the 'literal approach' (interpreting the law passed by Parliament as it is by giving its words their plain and ordinary meaning) to the 'purposive approach' (seeking to investigate the intent of the Parliament behind a law passed by it and at times effectively writing in to that law by adding, substitution and replacing words) is evident. Is it not judicial activism on a regular basis?
The institutional decay and malfunctioning accompanied by a breakdown of law and order, economic meltdown raises the question whether the long tradition of authoritarianism can be revamped by the present rulers in the name of democracy? In case of the failure by the present political managers, a new order is likely to emerge for which voices are already being heard...or this can be further delayed.Transition in the Pakistani context seems to be a fleeting concept and functional democracy remains distant.
(The writer is Senior Fellow at the Lahore School of Economics and can be reached at [email protected])