Revisiting Afghanistan’s ‘graveyard theory’—I

In case of Afghanistan, most of the history books, travelogues, print and electronic media and anchor reports frequently mention the “graveyard theory.” That is, Afghanistan been the ‘graveyard of empires’ insofar as no outside invader has ever been able to successfully conquer and establish control. However, there is a nuance to this generalization.

There is a difference between conquest, consolidation, and retention by the invading empire. Afghan history, like other nations, is no different from the inescapable fact that all big nations had to ultimately leave the occupied lands. This was the case in Afghanistan, too, in the face of stiff opposition by warlike Afghans, rugged terrains and extreme distrust of foreigners.

The ‘graveyard of empires’ trope hangs heaviest over the imperial adventures of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, especially as end of fighting coincided, roughly, with overall decline of the first two empires and, lately, the waning of the US global influence as a superpower.

How did the theory originate? It gained currency in the 19th-20th centuries when major powers viz., Britain followed by the SU and US had to exit under different circumstances and pressures. The theory was invented by the British who later propagated it. In fact, Britain gave currency to it through historical narratives, travelogues, media coverage and films.

Most likely, the imagery has a lot to do with the myth of Afghan invincibility. E.g., the picture at Tate museum of London shows British General Elphinstone as the sole survivor riding a bed-raggled horse back to Jalalabad in 1842. “These graphics of ‘imperial disaster’ got seared in the popular imagination,” says historian Ben Hopkins.

Many accounts written by military officers during operations of pre-Independent India’s unruly tribal regions and Afghanistan also tell the same story. In fact, the British themselves contributed to the theory to justify their shortcomings and operation failures in Afghanistan. Many Muslims have also invoked the Afghan invincibility myth as antipathy to American policies. President Biden and, earlier, some American generals had alluded to the Afghan invincibility before the fall of Kabul. Biden recently stated: “What’s happening now could just as easily happen five years ago or 15 years in the future.”

“‘Graveyard theory’ of empires misunderstands and misconstrues those (wars),” says Ben Hopkins, historian of Afghanistan and British imperialism. Also, Afghans themselves used to proclaim that anybody who dares conquer them will be turned into a ‘grave yard’. After all, some Afghans dynasties also ruled India and some of their rulers like Sher Shah Suri were admired in India.

But empirical evidence suggests that in human history all powers after having invaded foreign lands had to ultimately leave. In history, the Afghans were invaded by Greeks, Iranians, Assyrians Mongols, Mughals and then big powers.

All history is contemporary history. We tend to view the past through present lens. Indeed, the British, Russians, and lately the Americans, had to exit out of sheer exhaustion and loss of men and material: nevertheless, this does not mean that these powers were turned into ‘graveyards.’

Historians cite Alexander the Great’s difficulties in Afghanistan. The weakness of the thesis as a trans-historical generalization is evident in almost any historical era one chooses to investigate. Alexander was a conqueror and not an empire-builder. The forays of ancient Macedonians and Greeks, certainly Alexander, had troubles in the Hindu Kush as in other lands that his troops vanquished.

But ‘conquer and rule’ the region — the Greeks did. The Greek power instead of dissolving remained ensconced in the area — now called Afghanistan — for roughly two hundred years, contributing to an interchange of ideas and practices that enriched South Asian, Central Asian, and Greek civilizations. The so-called Greco-Bactrians did fall eventually, succumbing to Yuezhi (Kushan) invaders who absorbed much of their culture.

Expectedly, great powers ebb and flow and no empire lasts for long. Serious authors such as Christian Caryl and Thomas Barfield have turned the ‘graveyard’ cliché on its head, by arguing that Afghanistan is better interpreted historically as both a “highway of conquest” and a “cradle of empires.”

Even the British failure to subdue the region has been much exaggerated. As Caryl cogently noted, in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), Britain succeeded in occupying much of the country and forced its rulers to accept a treaty with a veto over future Afghan foreign policy. London, it should be noted, never intended to make Afghanistan part of its empire. Britain’s foreign-policy aim was ultimately achieved by ensuring that Afghanistan remained a buffer state outside the influence of imperial competitors such as the Russians.

The fact that an independent Afghanistan served British interests as a buffer state is evident in the very outline of the country. Northeastern Afghanistan features a curious panhandle, the Wakhan corridor that extends all the way to the border of China. Negotiations during the late 1800s, first between Britain and Russia, and then between British India and Afghanistan, ensured that the territories of the British and Russian empires would never directly touch each other. Resultantly, the Wakhan corridor was appended to Afghanistan.

(To be continued tomorrow)

(The writer has been Visiting Faculty, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Chairman Department of IR, NUML, former Adviser COMSATS, and President Islamabad Policy Research Institute)

Copyright Business Recorder, 2021