A dangerous crisis

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has raised international concerns about the risks and dangers inherent in such a conflict. While latest news reports say Russia and Ukraine are meeting on the Belarus-Ukrainian border to find a solution to this very dangerous crisis, the outcome, in the light of the fate of the Minsk I and II agreements to find a solution to the internal conflict that emerged between the eastern Ukraine Donbas region and the pro-western regime brought to power through an agitation in 2014, is still uncertain.

Some background may help to clarify the origins of the Ukraine crisis. After the Cold War ended (1989-91), the Soviet Union received assurances from the US-led west that NATO would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s (and later Russia’s) difficulties to expand into Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries that became independent in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet that is precisely what NATO set out to do in five consecutive rounds of what came to be known as ‘NATO-creep’. The result was the successor state Russia feeling increasingly hemmed in and its security threatened by advancing NATO’s arrival on its doorstep.

The ‘colour revolutions’ that replaced pro-Russian regimes in Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries in the region were once more seen in action in Ukraine in 2014 when a pro-Moscow regime was replaced by a pro-western one. Russia retaliated to this perceived threat by reclaiming Crimea, a strategic peninsula controlling access to the Black Sea and overwhelmingly Russian populated. Moscow also came out in support of the Donbas region’s breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, also largely Russian populated.

The crisis then was sought to be resolved through Ukrainian-Donbas separatists’ meetings and agreements hammered out in the Belarus capital Minsk, dubbed Minsk I and II. Minsk I agreed a 12-point ceasefire deal in September 2014. Its provisions included prisoner exchanges, deliveries of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of heavy weapons, five months into a conflict that had by then killed more than 2,600 people.

The agreement quickly broke down, with violations by both sides. Minsk II was the result of representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of the two pro-Russian separatist regions signing a 13-point agreement in February 2015.It set out military and political steps that remain unimplemented. The 13 points were, in brief:

1. An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides.

3. Monitoring and verification by the OSCE.

4. To start a dialogue on interim self-government for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in accordance with Ukrainian law, and acknowledge their special status by parliamentary resolution.

5. A pardon and amnesty for people involved in the fighting.

6. An exchange of hostages and prisoners.

7. Provision of humanitarian assistance.

8. Resumption of socio-economic ties, including pensions.

9. Restoration of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment and mercenaries.

11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine including decentralisation, with specific mention of Donetsk and Luhansk.

12. Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk on terms to be agreed with their representatives.

13. Intensifying the work of a Trilateral Contact Group comprising representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.

Why did these terms not move things towards a peaceful solution of the Donetsk and Luhansk issue? Because, Russian sources now tell us, these two regions have been under constant attack and bombardment by Ukraine for the last eight years. This has elicited the charge of genocide by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who seems to have finally lost patience in the face of the constant eastward expansion of NATO (including a proposal to allow Ukraine to join the western military alliance), unremitting Ukrainian attacks on the civilian population of Donetsk and Luhansk, and Ukraine’s failure to implement the provisions of Minsk I and II.

While it is necessary and important to understand what motivated Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine however, it may well turn out to be a stretch too far. The invasion of Ukraine to bring an end to the suffering of the people of Donetsk and Luhansk seems excessive, extremely dangerous for European and world peace, and could produce a fallout that would damage the entire globe. Putin’s order the other day to put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert followed his veiled allusion earlier to visit any interference or intervention in the Ukraine conflict by any other country with unprecedented consequences. Russia and NATO, let us not forget, are both nuclear-armed, with a devastating delivery capacity. The Russian military (despite its misadventure in Afghanistan in the 1980s) is a formidable force. The effects of western sanctions against Russia will be felt throughout the global economy, already under pressure because of the Covid pandemic. Global supply chains and the international financial system will be severely disrupted. Energy will no longer be available from Russia (including the Nordstream Gas Pipeline), producing shortages and devastating price rises. The sanctions, by now one of the ‘favourite’ economic/financial weapons in the west’s armoury, may relegate Russia to global pariah status, but will also impact the authors.

While the world holds its breath, the current round of talks between Russia and Ukraine offers a slim sliver of hope for a peaceful end to this war. Even Russia’s allies (foremost China) have been guarded and cautious in their stances on the issue because, while they may be sympathetic to Russia’s security concerns because of ‘NATO-creep’, they may also hold the view that Putin is attempting to kill a fly with a sledgehammer, a course likely to hurt the wielder as well as the victim and its supporters.

Pakistan has attempted once again to punch above its weight in holding telephonic contacts between our foreign minister and his Ukrainian counterpart, but no one is likely to take this seriously. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrival for a visit in Moscow on the day Russian forces began their advance into Ukraine could at best be seen as unlucky timing or at worst as the difficult task of winning economic cooperation from one-time enemy Russia made even more uncertain.

But if Russia can be accused of over-reach in the Ukrainian crisis, the contrast between US-led western bluster and their reluctance to intervene militarily in the light of the grave risks involved and arguably post-Afghanistan fatigue and war-weariness is also glaring. Eyeball to eyeball yes, but NATO seems reluctant to go any further (a cause for a sigh of relief perhaps). Instead, weaponised economic sanctions seem destined to be the US-led west’s option of choice, which may extend beyond the immediate crisis and extract a bigger toll from the world economy.

[email protected]

rashed-rahman.blogspot.com

Copyright Business Recorder, 2022