Considering that 2023 is the year of general elections and the fact that the economy is on constant oxygen-support of external loans, there is a high degree of interest among international donors and financiers in finding clues as to which political party might form the next government at the center and what its economic approach will be. It’s a hard question to answer in the absence of routine political polls; however, recent developments provide some insight into evaluating different plausible scenarios.
In recent days, political vibes have sounded supportive of early elections. The PTI’s dissolution of the Punjab assembly (likely followed by the KP assembly) has certainly revived the talk of premature polls. No less significant has been the individual posturing from PDM constituent parties in recent days. The MQM has suddenly united its various factions under one banner. The PPP has upped its electable-wooing game in South Punjab, KP, and Balochistan. Meanwhile, the PML-N chief has ordered political re-organization.
Following the bilateral funding commitments from UAE and KSA, can the Shehbaz government secure IMF’s ninth and tenth reviews by February? If yes, it can pave the way for a caretaker government by early March if all political stakeholders agree on early elections, which can then potentially take place in May after the month of Ramazan. Regardless of whether early polls are held or not, a pattern has emerged as to which party’s fortunes are on the way up and which party’s on the way down.
The PML-N, which is the face of the PDM government, is in deep electoral trouble, with little hope of revival over the next few months. The party’s ill-fated decision to headline the downing of the Khan government in April last year was followed by a misguided notion to preside over a government that could only bring alarming levels of economic suffering to the masses and destroys its political capital. As a result, the political fallout of even the previous government’s mismanagement has landed on PML-N’s door.
The ruling party’s electoral loss in the next general elections will be the gain of the other two major parties, which are both on the way up. Thanks to its post-ouster victimhood narrative, the PTI is expected to do well in its traditional base of KP as well as in Punjab’s northern and central regions. The by-elections in Punjab in July and October last year added to the dominant perception of former PM Khan’s popularity, which helped the party avoid defections and remain a cohesive unit despite internal political differences.
Be that as it may, both history and realpolitik may work against Khan returning as PM this year, as popularity alone does not make a government in Pakistan. Historically, there is no precedence for a political party in this country to win back-to-back general elections and successfully return to the office. Realistically, while Khan is in a strong position to make or force a deal with the ‘establishment,’ his reckless economic decisions and foreign-policy conspiracy theories in his latter days of power strongly go against him.
If Khan needs more time on the bench before his image is rehabilitated in the eyes of powers-that-be at home and friendly (donor) rulers abroad, it only leaves that grand old party (PPP) to take the wheel. There is plenty of local history where a different political party has been given a stint at the center until the roster is exhausted (PML-Q in 2002; PPP in 2008; PML-N in 2013; PTI in 2018). Keen, the PPP is also eyeing the biggest prize, working hard to win back its influence in South Punjab, KP, and Balochistan.
If former President Zardari’s tactics work in bringing back influential politicos, PPP can capitalize on its Sindh power base and get close to 100/272 seats in the next general elections, thereby becoming a strong candidate to form a coalition government. If that happened, it would be just in time as Benazir’s son turns 35 (and becomes eligible to be PM) later this year. The clue as to why PPP may be more palatable to the ‘system’ lies in its accommodative political positions for some 15 years under Zardari and Bilawal. The latter’s months as Foreign Minister (and sharp anti-India statements) have also bought him credentials.
Getting a simple majority won’t likely be easy for PTI despite its popularity, as other parties may make constituency-level alliances to reclaim the seats which they lost in their urban strongholds back in 2018 polls. Even if PTI is able to repeat its 2018 performance of getting 116/272 NA seats, it won’t likely be able to form a coalition government, because i) Khan is himself loathe to form a ‘weak government again, and ii) smaller parties (such as MQM, BNP, BAP, and other regional parties) have also fallen out with the PTI. Rest assured, whichever party forms the next government, it will have to walk an economic tightrope.
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