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In Pakistan, we often adhere to the belief that force is the primary solution for dealing with terrorists, extremists, separatists, insurgents, and even civil unrest, whether it involves political, religious parties, students, or civil society. The prevailing notion is that if force doesn’t achieve the desired outcome, more force should be applied.

In contrast, China’s approach in Xinjiang, where separatism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism were significant issues since 1949, has been to respond with massive infrastructural development.

When challenges arise, China has chosen to accelerate development further. These two philosophies—force versus development—are starkly opposed and have yielded opposite results.

The insurgencies in Xinjiang, Balochistan, and Pakistan’s erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have distinct historical, ethnic, and geopolitical contexts, yet they share similarities in grievances but differ markedly in the governmental responses.

The narratives of the insurgencies in Xinjiang, Balochistan, and FATA share more similarities than differences. In Xinjiang, the Uyghur insurgency is driven by claims of cultural and religious repression, economic disenfranchisement, and ethnic discrimination.

The insurgents frame their struggle as a fight for cultural survival and autonomy, often invoking the idea of an independent “East Turkestan.” The Baloch insurgency, while lacking a religious element, is fueled by economic exploitation, particularly in natural resources like gas and minerals, political marginalization, and human rights abuses.

As one of Pakistan’s least developed regions, many Baloch feel excluded from their own wealth, seeking greater autonomy or independence, citing historical grievances and ongoing exploitation.

In FATA, the insurgency stems from resistance to Pakistan’s military operations, perceived interference in local customs, and the impact of the war on terror. The TTP, in particular, framed its struggle in religious terms, opposing the Pakistani state’s alignment with the US and seeking to impose their version of Sharia law.

When comparing the narratives of these three ethnic groups, the Uyghur and Taliban in FATA share more similarities, particularly in their use of religious connotations to justify their struggles for autonomy or independence.

In contrast, the Baloch narrative is distinctive due to its focus on economic and political grievances, without a religious dimension. Consequently, the Baloch narrative may be easier to address or counter compared to the more deeply rooted and ideologically driven narratives of the TTP and Uyghurs.

Qamar Bashir

Copyright Business Recorder, 2024

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