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India has fast-tracked construction of hydropower projects in IIOJ&K and at the same time, through its Geospatial Bill, is preventing IFIs from financing hydropower projects in the AJ&K.

The definition of water security includes the statement that “Without water security there can be no national security”. Immediately after partition in 1947, India suddenly suspended all the river water flowing into Pakistan.

To avoid conflict and preserve peace, the Indus Water Treat 1960 (the “Treaty”) was finally negotiated and signed on 19 September 1960, between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan.

Brokered by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank), the purpose of the Treaty, as stated in the preamble, was to attain the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, and to recognise the rights and obligations of each party in relation to the other concerning the use of these waters, and making provisions for settlement of disputes in a cooperative spirit.

The Treaty allows India unrestricted use of the waters of the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas & Sutlej) while Pakistan, as lower riparian, has unrestricted use of the waters of the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum & Chenab).

The Treaty further specifies the terms and conditions under which India may utilise the water from the Western Rivers, otherwise in Pakistan’s exclusive domain, such as any new agricultural use (Annexure C para 9), new water storages (Annexure D para 10) and new hydro-electric plants (Annexure D Para 15 (iii)). It is important to note that the key operative provision in each of these provisions is that the specific activity is allowed “only to the extent that the then existing Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected”.

These provisions have been interpreted, by India, to mean it can freely construct run-of-the river hydropower projects on flowing water and storages (with limits and conditions), provided they do not adversely affect the water flow to the then existing hydroelectric plants or agricultural use in Pakistan.

In practical terms, if Pakistan does not utilize the water on specified rivers by constructing hydropower first, India has the right to use such unutilized water for their hydropower plants and secure the water rights, which would be protected and, in such instances, Pakistan would lose these water rights forever.

Such events have already been witnessed on the River Neelum, where Pakistan was slow to act on its Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, while India started construction of the Kishanganga hydropower project earlier. This delay led to a loss of about 14% of the water flows in the River Neelum in Pakistan which is likely permanent, and the incremental generation will be lost, affecting all present and future hydropower projects on the River Neelum.

All future hydropower plants which are constructed on the River Neelum will have a lower water flow resulting in a lower power capacity, thus incurring losses that would go into billions of rupees.

All feasibility studies of hydropower projects on River Neelum now model the installed capacity and power generation around two scenarios (a) pre-Kishanganga and (b) post-Kishanganga; with the energy generation based on the post-Kishanganga case.

India has re-classified large hydropower, over 25MW, as a renewable energy resource and the Indian government has taken some important initiatives which satisfy its two main objectives (a) establishment of its water rights; and (b) development of its power needs from hydropower, claiming that, unlike wind and solar, it is one of the few renewable resources that enable peaking power and grid stability.

Some of the key initiatives, which have spurred the growth of hydropower in IIOJ&K are (a) declaring large hydropower as a renewable energy source; (b) providing for a hydro purchase obligation within the renewable purchase obligation requiring electricity retailers to purchase a minimum percentage of their electricity demand from hydropower projects; (c) providing budgetary support for the cost of enabling infrastructure, i.e., roads/bridges and flood moderation; (d) introducing guidelines to reduce incidence of time and cost overrun for hydropower projects; and (e) waiver of Inter State Transmission System charges on transmission of electricity generated from new hydroelectric projects.

India introduced the Geospatial Bill in 2016 and as part of this forward planning, some 4 years later in 2019, revoked Article 370 and 35-A of the Indian constitution bringing Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir into the Union territories. After the Geospatial Bill, all international financial institutions including but not limited to ADB, IFC and the World Bank have stopped financing hydropower projects in AJ&K and GB.

Thus, on the one hand India was taking steps to prevent new hydropower projects being developed in the AJ&K, and on the other it was also speeding up its own hydropower development in IIO&JK; a perfect strategy to widen the gap between IIO&JK and AJ&K hydropower development and enforce India’s rights over the Western Rivers of Pakistan. India’s initiatives and focus on hydropower has led to the development of over thirty (30) hydropower projects with a total capacity of some 16,475MW which are being actively pursued in IIOJ&K.

On the other hand, on the Pakistan side, policy confusion and lack of clarity has impacted hydropower development as the country continues to drag its feet in the name of one policy hurdle or another while continuing its romance with thermal power generation.

Eleven (11) hydropower projects with a total capacity of 4,784MW are being developed in AJ&K. Of these, four projects totaling 1,049MW have been completed, many decades after identification, while seven (7) projects totaling 3,735MW have been under development for many years and are still facing hurdles and barriers without much real Government support or interest.

Unfortunately, this conundrum continues due to bureaucratic delays, lack of clear thinking and contradictions of vision and policy.

Even willing Chinese state-owned investors who were ready to finance, construct, operate and transfer these projects to the Government free of cost, are losing interest due to numerous barriers, obstacles and the state of the power sector in Pakistan.

This has come to a point where the Chinese enthusiasm and interest has now faded. This flawed policy has severely delayed implementation of these strategic projects and is indirectly fulfilling the Indian ambitions of control over the Western Rivers. It is also important to note that in the absence of IFIs, only the Chinese and Korean investors have shown interest to develop, finance, construct and operate hydropower projects in AJ&K and GB.

While we slacken our hold and lose our attention, India is diligently pursuing its hydropower goals, effectively impacting and inhibiting our future hydropower generation and water rights.

This is a serious threat to Pakistan’s water rights and must be corrected before it is too late. Development of hydropower in AJ&K and GB should be forcefully promoted and encouraged.

Pakistan should take the long overdue steps and declare AJ&K and GB hydropower projects as “strategic” so that such projects are classified as “committed” and do not get obstructed by short term planning and failure to see the bigger picture.

All hydropower projects of whatever capacity should be declared as a renewable resource. To attain our goals, thought should be given to continue facilitation and promotion of hydropower with various incentives, even after the competitive electricity market is finally brought into play.

Delayed action on these legacy issues does not affordhydropower the facilitation and priority that itdeserves, while India remains busy constructing new hydropower projects and trying to establish its firm rights on our rivers.

Bearing in mind our supreme security interests, protection of our water rights and to reduce reliance on expensive imported fuels, Pakistan should incentivise and encourage development of hydropower on a war footing.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2024

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