In a political landscape where entrenched interests and recycled economic ideologies dominate, Muhammad Aurangzeb’s appointment as Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Finance & Revenue was hailed as a break from the past. His nomination by the Shehbaz Sharif government after the February 2024 general elections signaled a bold departure from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s traditional economic playbook. For the first time since 1997, the party overlooked its resident finance czar, Ishaq Dar, opting instead for a technocrat with no ties to the political elite.
Aurangzeb brought with him not just an impressive resume, but the hope of meaningful reform. With a distinguished career spanning senior roles at global financial institutions like Citibank, ABN AMRO, RBS, and JP Morgan, and a transformative leadership tenure at Habib Bank Limited (HBL), where he turned around the institution’s legacy inefficiencies into a modern, tech-driven operation, Aurangzeb’s reputation as a results-oriented reformer preceded him.
But reputation alone does not build a legacy. A year into his tenure, despite his clear-eyed rhetoric and thoughtful speeches, Aurangzeb has yet to translate his bold policy agenda into concrete action. Unlike his predecessors, Ishaq Dar, Shaukat Tareen, or Asad Umar, who often displayed hesitation in aligning with international financial institutions, Aurangzeb has shown consistent ownership of the IMF program. He has repeatedly emphasized that reforms required under the IMF’s guidance are not just external impositions, but necessary steps Pakistan must take, with or without the Fund, to achieve sustainable economic growth.
His reform agenda is ambitious and, on paper, comprehensive. From rightsizing government expenditures to overhauling Pakistan’s flawed taxation system, from broad-based privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to deregulation and energy sector reforms—the scope of his proposed changes is nothing short of transformative. He has rightly argued for broadening the tax net instead of repeatedly burdening the already-taxed salaried and corporate sectors. He has also recognized the need for redefining federal-province fiscal relations, encouraging provinces to build their own revenue-raising capacities rather than relying on federal transfers.
However, despite saying all the right things, Aurangzeb has struggled to walk the talk. His first budget as finance minister revealed a disappointing reality. Rather than relieving the formal sector, already groaning under high taxes, the budget-imposed tax rates as high as 45 percent on salaried and corporate entities. Meanwhile, the budget outlay, current expenditure, and revenue targets all rose by 30 percent, signaling an unwillingness or inability to implement the austerity measures his speeches so often championed.
No significant steps have been taken toward rightsizing bloated ministries or eliminating redundant government departments. The development budget, paradoxically, saw an increase of 47 percent, even as the country teeters on the brink of fiscal collapse. Privatization remains stalled, with bureaucrats and policymakers endlessly debating whether certain SOEs are “strategic” or “non-strategic.” Similarly, deregulation—a key pillar of his stated reforms—remains an unfulfilled promise, with no major announcements or timelines shared.
One could argue, in his defense, that the political labyrinth of Pakistan is uniquely challenging, even for someone with Aurangzeb’s clarity of vision and reformist zeal. Reports of his quiet removal from the Cabinet Committee on Privatization early in his tenure suggest that entrenched interests within the government may be actively undermining his reform agenda. Yet rather than becoming a maverick or speaking out against internal sabotage, Aurangzeb has opted for a more diplomatic approach, choosing to navigate the political maze in the hope of achieving incremental gains.
The problem, however, is that time is a luxury no finance minister in Pakistan can afford. Global precedents show that successful reforms in developing economies are often implemented in the early years of government, before political cycles and vested interests derail the process. In Pakistan, the situation is even more precarious. With Senate elections looming in the next 18-24 months, and key judicial and military appointments on the horizon, the window for implementing substantive reforms is rapidly closing. As history has shown, the closer the country moves toward these pivotal events, the more likely it is that backdoor politicking will take precedence over economic policymaking.
Aurangzeb’s challenge is not just one of policy design but of execution under immense political pressure. His clarity of thought has earned him respect among international partners, private sector stakeholders, and independent commentators. Yet, good intentions alone will not deliver the structural reforms Pakistan needs. As the budget-making process for the 2025-26 fiscal year begins, Aurangzeb must publicly lay out a concrete blueprint for reform.
The first step is initiating an honest national dialogue on the political and economic costs of inaction. His plans for privatization, tax reforms, deregulation, and energy sector restructuring will require broad-based coalitions across the political spectrum, private sector partnerships, and buy-in from both bureaucratic elites and citizen groups. The bureaucracy, often a silent killer of reform initiatives, will resist any changes that threaten its power or influence—particularly efforts to privatize SOEs, streamline tax collection, or curtail unnecessary government expenditure.
Aurangzeb cannot afford to operate as if time is on his side. His increasing involvement in micromanagement, such as price monitoring committees and lamenting fluctuations in sugar or ghee prices, risks diluting his focus from the larger economic reforms that Pakistan so desperately needs. While his commitment to not replicating the failures of his predecessors deserves recognition, setting the bar this low does a disservice to millions of Pakistanis who deserve more than just marginal improvements.
To secure his legacy, Aurangzeb must act swiftly and decisively. The time for cautious diplomacy is over. Pakistan needs bold leadership and swift execution to break free from its cycle of economic stagnation. The next 18 months will be critical—not just for Aurangzeb’s reputation, but for the economic future of the nation. The blueprint for reform must be laid out now, and the hard work of coalition-building, institutional reform, and political negotiation must begin without delay.
If he fails to seize this moment, history will remember Muhammad Aurangzeb not as the visionary reformer Pakistan needed, but as yet another name in a long list of technocrats who had the right ideas but lacked the urgency to act on them. And for Pakistan, that is a cost too high to bear.
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