Kishanganga and Ratle hydropower projects: a fait accompli?

The Neutral Expert Forum of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague was scheduled to hear Pakistan’s case (No. 2023-14) on September 11-12 last year concerning India’s construction of two major hydropower projects—the 330-MW Kishanganga and the 850-MW Ratle—on rivers originating in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and flowing into Pakistan.

These projects, located on the Kishanganga/Neelum and Chenab rivers, respectively, have long been contentious under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, which governs the use of shared water resources between the two countries.

Despite Pakistan’s delegation attending the proceedings, the government has yet to release any statement on the case’s status or even confirm whether the hearings were held as scheduled. This silence raises troubling questions about Pakistan’s commitment to defending its water rights. Meanwhile, Indian media reported that on August 30, 2024, India served Pakistan a formal notice seeking government-to-government negotiations to review the IWT under its relevant provisions. This move appeared to be a strategic manoeuvre to undermine Pakistan’s case by shifting the legal discussion away from the PCA forum. On September 19, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson stated that issues concerning the IWT could be addressed through the appointed Commissioners for Indus Waters from both countries. However, no concrete developments have emerged since then.

It remains unclear whether Pakistan has effectively pursued its position at the PCA or whether it has tacitly accepted India’s water projects as irreversible.

The Kishanganga power station has been operational since May 2018, and the Ratle project, under construction since June 2013, is scheduled for commissioning in May 2026. These projects directly impact Pakistan’s water security by altering natural river flows. Given their potential to deprive Pakistan of its fair share of water, the government’s lack of transparency on this issue is both alarming and unacceptable.

Pakistan’s failure to provide timely updates suggests either a lack of seriousness in addressing this issue or an intentional decision to keep the public uninformed. At stake is Pakistan’s long-term water security, which is already under stress due to climate change and unsustainable water management. The silence from relevant authorities raises pressing concerns: Has Pakistan lost its case at the PCA? If not, what progress has been made? And why has there been no significant reaction to India’s ongoing violations of the Treaty.

Pakistan’s record of contesting IWT violations at international forums has been largely ineffective. Over the decades, it has raised objections—bilaterally and internationally—to multiple Indian projects, including Wullar Barrage, Baglihar Dam, and Uri, and Kishanganga Hydropower. Each of these projects, in different ways, has been designed in violation of the Treaty, depriving Pakistan of its rightful water share. Despite these objections, successive Pakistani governments have failed to take proactive and effective legal action, often acting too late to challenge Indian projects before they become operational.

Under the IWT, Pakistan has exclusive rights to the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, while India has rights over the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. However, India has consistently found ways to exploit legal loopholes, constructing dams and reservoirs on rivers allocated to Pakistan under the pretext of run-of-river hydropower projects. While the Treaty permits such projects under specific conditions, Pakistan has repeatedly argued that India’s designs violate these provisions by significantly altering water flows.

The Treaty regulates all water infrastructure on the Indus River and its tributaries, setting clear conditions for dam designs, water storage, and flow regulations. Pakistan has also objected to several ongoing hydropower projects in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, including Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Miyar (120 MW), and Lower Kalnai (48 MW). Despite these objections, India has now launched construction of another project at the Kishanganga site—an extension of the existing Kishanganga power station.

The 40-MW Kishanganga-II project, currently in its early stages, will further impact Pakistan’s downstream water supply, aggravating the already severe ecological and hydrological disturbances in the region. The existing Kishanganga power station has already reduced Neelum River flows by more than 30%, amounting to an estimated one-million-acre-feet (MAF) water deficit. The construction of Kishanganga-II will likely intensify these effects, jeopardizing Pakistan’s 969-MW Neelum-Jhelum hydropower station, which has remained shut for repairs since May 2024, and livelihood of the Neelum Valley inhabitants.

Pakistan’s delegation, which visited the Kishanganga and Ratle project sites in June 2024 as part of the Neutral Expert proceedings, must have been aware of these developments. If the government was informed, why has there been no official response? Is the lack of public information a deliberate attempt to obscure policy failures, or does it reflect sheer negligence? On February 10, the National Assembly was informed by the Ministry of Water Resources that India has not shared any information with Pakistan about the development of any new run-of-the river project or any other project under the provisions of the IWT.

Water is a prime national security concern for Pakistan, and India’s expanding hydropower infrastructure represents a direct threat. In September 2016, India openly threatened to block the Indus River’s water flow into Pakistan. Although China swiftly responded by halting water flows from a Brahmaputra tributary in Tibet, discouraging India from immediate action, the broader trend remains unchanged. India is steadily increasing its water storage capacity on the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, which flow into Pakistan. Reports indicate that India is storing up to 20 MAF of water across these rivers and has plans for 155 large and medium dams, reservoirs, and hydropower stations, with a cumulative capacity of about 32,000 MW.

If left unchallenged, these developments will severely reduce water availability in Pakistan, affecting agriculture, drinking water supplies, and overall economic stability. Given that over 90% of Pakistan’s water is used for irrigation, any reduction in river flows could lead to widespread food insecurity. The government must recognize that water is not merely a legal issue but an existential one.

The government’s passive approach to water disputes with India must change. Legal battles at the PCA and negotiations under the IWT framework are essential, but they must be pursued with clarity, urgency, and transparency.

The public has the right to know what is being done to safeguard Pakistan’s water rights, and a national water security strategy must be developed to counter India’s aggressive expansion.

Pakistan must also explore diplomatic avenues to engage international stakeholders and water law experts to strengthen its case. More importantly, it must invest in domestic water conservation, storage infrastructure, and alternative sources to reduce reliance on contested water flows.

India’s encroachments on Pakistan’s water resources are not isolated incidents; they are part of a calculated strategy to control regional water dynamics. If Pakistan continues to delay action, it risks irreversible damage to its water security, agriculture, and economy. The government must demonstrate the resolve, capability, and political will to defend Pakistan’s water rights under the IWT before it is too late.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2025