Peace in Afghanistan

Of the vows and undertakings that Team Obama made to American voters the one most appealing was that if elected their sons and daughters would be back home from Afghanistan before the 31st December 2014 deadline. The American public knew well that Afghanistan is historically the 'graveyard of empires', and the United States would be no exception to it. The US government, however, took more time and at colossal cost in imbibing the truth of this quote. But at the end of the day, we heard President Obama saying 'a decade of war is ending'. With American public having scored a decisive victory over the war-mongering lobby at Hill a negotiated peace in Afghanistan is now a strong possibility. Yet it's not as easy as it would appear to be because the ground realities over the last year or so have dramatically and drastically changed.
There was a time when the Taliban were said to be willing to disavow al Qaeda and reciprocate a cease-fire offer. But that could not be the case now: given that US-led coalition forces are on way out of Afghanistan the domino effect of which cannot be ruled out.
We don't know if such a scenario was under consideration of the authors of the 'roadmap' the visiting Afghan High Peace Council delegation is said to be carrying. If no, the statement issued by Pakistan Foreign Office and the interview given by Ambassador Mohammad Sadiq on the eve of the visit should be of some help to the visitors.
The impression that Pakistan can greatly influence Taliban strategy may have been correct in the past but no more. Having successfully withstood attack launched by the present day's most powerful war machine the Afghan insurgents feel it's now their turn to dictate terms for peace parleys. The increasing tempo of 'green-on-blue' attacks tend to further raise their morale as it clearly indicates that their point of view is gaining popularity. And, no less importantly, the time is on their side; they can wait while the coalition forces cannot. But that said one would not say that their interest to have peace in Afghanistan is in anyway dwindled. It is therefore quite possible that even when the Taliban may be saying no to peace talks they would agree to cease hostilities on a reciprocal basis, which in turn would facilitate the exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
A second reading of Ambassador Sadiq's reported interview suggests that the visiting Afghan Peace Council delegation is not very close to the realities on the ground. The delegation would like Islamabad to weigh in with the so-called 'Quetta Shura' - if something like this exists in the Balochistan capital. How about talking to the Haqqani network, the delegation would be indeed hard put to suggest a viable technique given the fact that this group of Afghan insurgents has earned the UN Security Council stigma of being a "terrorist organisation" ruling out negotiations with it. Perhaps, the visitors would be as much interested in establishing Islamabad's alleged duplicity as in walking the Afghan peace talks.
Undeniably there are powerful cliques in the Karzai government, referred to as the "very important people (in Kabul) who fought against the Taliban and are not still ready to talk and negotiate with the Taliban" by Ambassador Sadiq. Pakistan is fully cognisant of all this, but for it kick-starting the peace process in Afghanistan is too vital an objective to be subordinated to all other considerations.
A peaceful Afghanistan means a peaceful Pakistan. The task before the three-day conference is challenging and to expect it coming up with a solution would be naïve to say the least. But it has the desired potential by virtue of its diverse ethnic and political composition. And it has to meet more often, be more pragmatic and motivated by no other consideration than to secure peace in Afghanistan without any further loss of time.