Imtiaz Gul is a renowned defence and political analyst. He is currently the Executive Director of 'Center for Research and Security Studies', Islamabad, which he founded in December 2007 for independent research and advocacy on issues of governance, security and radicalisation. An author of four books and numerous international papers on security and counterterrorism, Gul regularly writes on these subjects in domestic media, as well as for international publications such as Foreign Policy and the Wall Street Journal.
Following are some excerpts from BR Research's recent sit-down with him in Islamabad:
BR Research: Pakistan and India share a chequered, but mostly hostile history. How can the two countries get past occasional distractions that often threaten to derail fragile gains cobbled together on issues of trade normalisation and territorial disputes?
Imtiaz Gul: In the Indo-Pak context, the negative impacts of border incidents generally go away with the passage of time. It took India two years to put behind the Mumbai incident, but it returned to the talks. The mutual mistrust will always be there, though. From the Indian perspective, I don't think the mistrust will go away very easily as long as Pakistan's existing policies towards militancy remain. However, functional bilateral relations will get better over time, because there is no way around improving economic relations and creating economic linkages. The picture that is emerging is one of more reason, of a growing understanding that the two countries cannot conduct diplomacy with emotions.
It is a good sign that Pakistan's military hierarchy realises the importance of better relations with India for economic reasons. Therefore, in the larger picture, I see convergence of people on both sides who want to open up their markets for more trade and realise the need for more bilateral exchange. However, India being the bigger country will have to show magnanimity in this respect and avoid its arrogant dispositions. For instance, following the border incidents in January this year, India went back on its visa policy and decided to stop Pakistani senior citizens and children from entering India - that should have been avoided.
I strongly believe that the key to economic revival and livelihood improvement in Pakistan lies in economic linkages with India. Normalisation of relations with India is a prerequisite for that, and the onus falls on Pakistan to strive for normalisation. However, I am clear that the onus for creating space for Pakistan to do that is much greater on India due to its large geography and economy. What Pakistan can do is to remove the points of friction, neutralise the 'eyesores', and expedite trade normalisation measures like the MFN.
BRR: If the constituency for peaceful coexistence is growing within the two countries, what is stopping the breakthroughs?
IG: There is one key issue that has hampered major breakthroughs in our bilateral relations. When it comes to Pakistan, the Indian side has this tendency to drag its feet when they are close to reaching a deal. For instance, in 2006-07, then President Pervez Musharraf's administration was close to come to a negotiated settlement on the Kashmir dispute with India. Yet India dithered on the final moment, citing internal crises facing Pakistan back then for its refusal to proceed on the matter. That was a very good time to at least settle on a roadmap for Kashmir. There was a golden opportunity, but the Indians went back into 'wait and see' mode. That deprived India and Pakistan of a big opportunity on mending fences on Kashmir.
BRR: Though bilateral relations have improved in recent years, the defence spending is increasing on both sides and the arms build-up continues. How can this paradox be understood and resolved?
IG: The arms build-up and expenditures on maintaining the two militaries are increasing. While India has justified its higher defence spending by citing threats from China on its north eastern border, Pakistan also uses the same argument citing the military maintained by a neighbour ten times bigger on its eastern border. India, however, doesn't accept Pakistan's argument. I believe that this argument should not be applied selectively. Naturally, regional hostilities decline as trade normalisation takes course. But, my question is, how would India justify its increasing defence expenditures citing the Chinese threat when a couple of years down the lane its trade with China exceeds a hundred billion dollars?
Pakistan faces difficulties in remaining part of this race due to fiscal constraints. In terms of percentage of GDP, Pakistan's defence spending is not far behind India's. However, due to tight budgets, Pakistan's arms acquisitions have been NIL in recent years. It has a 6-lac-strong standing army, which is costly to maintain, but cannot be scaled down due to the added factor of volatility from Afghanistan post US withdrawal. On the other hand, India has done various multi-billion dollar arms deals with major powers like the US, Russia and France, in recent years. India is also maintaining an army twice the size of Pakistan's, but it is bearing its huge operational cost.
So, this volatile region is entangled in a vicious cycle. After US winds down its forces to minimum in Afghanistan next year, the volatility may further increase. If relations are on a better course, there will be no room for scheming. However, there is a likelihood that the security concerns for Pakistan will increase if hostilities with India continued because India has a much greater capacity to prick Pakistan.
BRR: Pakistan has a poor perception problem. How does India figure in that?
IG: It is unfortunate but the world has started to see Pakistan from India's eyes. That is why Pakistan is still blamed and attracts a label for supporting militant outfits, despite so many sacrifices given by the country. Pakistan needs to decide whether it wants to change that perception through taking some actions or just wait for this perception to die out. I think that the country needs to present demonstrable proof to the world that it is not connected to these outfits anymore. Here, the onus is on Pakistan to prove that it is narrowing the space for these outfits. But it's not easy...
BRR: How do you see the recent developments on matters of Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project and handing over of the Gwadar Deep Sea Port to China?
IG: I don't think Pakistan will behave the way North Korea or at times Israelis behave. Rather than playing one against the other (i.e. black-mailing), Islamabad would press ahead with the IP gas pipeline project as much as possible. Whether IP or Gwadar, in both cases, Pakistan as a whole seems to be displaying greater need-driven pragmatism and hopefully will continue this course.
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