N-delivery missile systems: US Congress expresses concern over growing Sino-Pak cooperation

The United States' Congress has expressed concern over growing Sino-Pak cooperation in what it says Medium Range Nuclear Delivery Missiles Systems. In a classified letter jointly written by Mike Rogers, Chairman Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Ted Poe, Chairman Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade 2 US lawmakers have sent a joint letter to Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Secretary Defense Ashton B. Carter and Director National Intelligence General James Clapper (Retd), two US lawmakers stated, "On March 23, 2011, Pakistan held its annual Pakistan Day Military Parade and revealed its new 2750 kilometers range 'Shaheen-III medium range nuclear ballistic missile (MRBM) that was carried on a 16-wheeler transporter erector launcher (TEL).

Richard Fisher, a leading specialist in Chinese Military technology, wrote to us in the attached letter noting the design similarities between the Shaheen-III TEL, the Sanjiang Special Vehicle Corporation of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) WS 51200 TEL, and a Chinese-provided TEL North Korea's new KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This led him to conclude, 'CASIC has again enabled a Pakistani nuclear missile capability'".

Lawmakers said, "we are deeply concerned that the TEL displayed in Pakistan was acquired from China. The transfer of an item as advanced and significant as a TEL would require the approval from the highest levels of China's government if not also the People's Liberation Army. Such cooperation between Pakistan and China would represent a 'threat' to the national security of the United States itself and its allies.

Based on this threat, we ask for your prompt reply to the following questions:

1) Is there any evidence that China or Chinese have supplied TELs or trucks capable of being modified to TELs for Pakistan medium- range nuclear ballistic missile? If so how many? And when did the Administration learn of the possibility that such TELs would be transferred to Pakistan? and of the transfers?

2) What, if anything has, the Administration done to ensure China halts such cooperation and demands return of these TELs.

3) What entities in Pakistan and in China were conduits for the transfer of funding involved in this transfer?

4) Is there any other evidence of Chinese entity support for Pakistan's ballistic missile programme or nuclear weapons programme, whether technology transfer or otherwise?

5) Would such cooperation be in violation of any United Nations' Security Council resolutions or any US sanction laws? If so will the Administration levy any sanctions against China for this apparent support for the Pakistani ballistic missile programme?

6) How does the presence of Pakistani road-mobile MRBMs with possible nuclear warheads change US-Israel and other allies' security posture? What are the impacts for US and allied (again including Israel) missile defenses?

Mike Rogers and Ted Poe further quizzed "where proliferation occurs that threatens the national security of the United States and its allies, it must be countered quickly and forcefully. We look forward to receiving your response to these critical questions". A Congressional letter to General James Clapper who has been dealing with Pakistan military since 1993 does indicate the sponsorship from a strong Indian lobby at the Hill. American Congress has recently interdicted sale of F-16s to Pakistan.