The Trump challenge

A group of experts and former US officials has advised the next US President to plan for a long-term American role in Afghanistan. In the view of the group, the watchword for this new approach should be one of an enduring partnership, based on mutual commitment.
However, the group finds that sustaining operations in Afghanistan without Pakistani ground lines of communication would be very difficult and costly. Other considerations, according to this group, like the criticality of this nuclear-armed country of 200 million remaining stable and also remaining at peace with its neighbours, peaceful internally and economically thriving, argued strongly for US-Pakistan cooperation.
If President-elect Trump were to take this advice and his administration were to follow up there is a possibility that Pakistan could expect very soon the revival of another transactional relationship (the fourth round) with the US. But in view of the fact that the last three such relationships (During the regimes of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf) had ended up causing gigantic socio-economic and political problems for Pakistan, would not Islamabad like to see a qualitative change this time around, if at all such an opportunity is to come up, in the nature of relationship from transactional to a more longer lasting, enduring and mutually beneficial cooperation in terms of geo-economics rather than purely geo-politics?
For example, Pakistan could request in return for facilities for ground lines of communications and dismantling of sanctuaries of Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis in various parts of the country the revival of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) on Pakistan-Afghanistan border for the manufacture and export of textiles and apparels duty free to the US plus initiating the process of US-Pakistan bilateral trade agreement. The ROZs could be provided protection by joint Pakistan-Afghanistan troops patrolling the area. The US help could also be sought for establishing a Free Trade Zone in the no-man's land straddling the Durand Line.
The group comprising Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, Robert Finn, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ronald Neumann (Ambassadors to Afghanistan); John Allen, David Barno, John Campbell, Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus (Military Commanders in Afghanistan); James Dobbins, Marrc Grossman (Special Representatives for Afghanistan/Pakistan); Vanda Felbab-Brown, Michael O'Hanlon, Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution, Seth Jones of Rand Corporation, Clare Lockhart of Institution for State Effectiveness, David Sedney and Earl Anthony (Tony) of Center for Strategic and International Studies (Scholars on Afghanistan) in a panel discussion held in Washington on September 14, 2016 had concluded that the next US President should plan for a partnership of generational in duration with Afghanistan, given the nature of the threat and the likely longevity of its future manifestations.
According to this group, the course of action the US has pursued since the early 2000s with regards to Pakistan had not produced the needed changes in Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan. Pakistan, the group said, tolerates and, in some cases, supports the forces that target and kill US military and civilian personnel, other foreigners, and many Afghans. The Taliban, the group added, has safe havens within parts of Pakistan and access there to funds and equipment.
"Some believe that Pakistanis tolerate the Taliban out of conviction that America will again desert them-just as it did in 1989. But the United States has already stayed in Afghanistan 15 years this time, with no plans to leave. Under our proposal it would envision staying in the region a good deal longer. This is desirable, and it should help allay Pakistani fears that it will again face an Afghanistan in chaos or an Afghanistan dominated by its rival, India. Our purpose should be to change Pakistan's calculus over time, while recognising that whatever policies we adopt, Islamabad will likely not change its Afghanistan policy quickly (even if civilian leaders in Pakistan decide they favour that outcome).
"This serious situation calls for a fundamental review of available options by the next US administration. Without advocating these as a group, we would suggest serious consideration of some or all of the below (though some of us are more wary of the last two options):
-- The United States could take further steps to pressure Taliban sanctuaries within Pakistan (with or without the support of Islamabad). The May, 2016 killing of Mullah Mansour, the head of the Afghan Taliban, while he was travelling through south-western Pakistan indicates the kind of direct action against the Taliban and Haqqani Network that could make an important difference.
-- The Obama administration and Congress have already reduced Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan in recent years, and curtailed the use of Foreign Military Financing as well. But even today's reduced amounts of US assistance could be cut further. If Pakistan's role in Afghanistan does not improve, in fact, the US Congress will likely see to that, whatever the next American president may wish.
-- Targeted economic sanctions could be selectively applied against certain specific organisations and individuals; Washington could encourage other countries to consider similar steps.
-- Pakistan could even be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, a finding that would not only be embarrassing to the country but also harmful to its economic prospects, given the likely influence on potential investors."
On the other hand, the group said Washington might also sketch out a vision of an improved relationship with Pakistan if Islamabad would show more forthright and consistent support for the goals of Nato in Afghanistan. This outcome, it said, would be highly desirable for broader American interests, given Pakistan's central role in the stability of the entire region-and its ability to upend that stability. Washington should, the group added, underscore that it could only be realised after Pakistan had verifiably acted to end its policies of sanctuary and support for the insurgents.
The group thought the numerous complexities were made more challenging by the dual role of Pakistan-part friend, part strategic challenge in the conflict.
The group said while there is no easy answer about how to improve US relations with Pakistan, the US should expect that clear articulation of an enduring American commitment to Afghanistan and the region can only help in gradually reducing the distrust and rivalry that often predominate in the relationships in Central and South Asia today.
The group recalled that President HW Bush concluded back in 1989 that Afghanistan was not worth continued US investment. After covert programs in the 1980s to aid the Afghan mujahedeen, the United States effectively withdrew from the region.
But ignoring Afghanistan proved unwise, the group said. It pointed out that the turmoil that ensued in Afghanistan after 1989 ultimately gave rise to the Taliban-and then to the sanctuary for al Qaeda that the Taliban provided Osama bin Laden. Adding it said the US disengagement also helped create cynicism among many Pakistani security officials about American motives and American dependability.
Pakistan, the group said, was left largely on its own to cope with the aftermath of the successful mujahedeen effort against Soviet forces, absorbing millions of refugees and other burdens and also the US departure "encouraged some Pakistani leaders to believe that we would ultimately give them a free hand in Afghanistan to pursue their own interests."
As a consequence, the group said, Pakistanis have referenced this past American behaviour to call into question US commitment to the region going forward and they have often then used this concern to justify Pakistan's own policies of tolerating and in some cases supporting Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network safe havens on its territory.
These safe havens, in the group's opinion, have perhaps more than any other factor, precluded successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency campaign within Afghanistan and they are likely to continue doing so.
"To be sure, nations such as Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan are also central in this great counterterrorism challenge of our times. And Pakistan is particularly significant in that regard, with some 200 million people, more than 100 nuclear weapons, and a number of al Qaeda senior leaders and extremist groups on its territory.
"The operational US goals in Afghanistan should be twofold. In the short term, our objective should be an Afghanistan increasingly capable of handling its security challenges and governance duties with only modest foreign help. In the longer term, the goal should be a peaceful, more prosperous, and better governed country that contributes to regional security. To accomplish these objectives, the United States and other key foreign actors such as Nato allies, India, and China, as well as the EU and UN, should seek the following:- to help sustain and strengthen the Afghan state,- to prevent the establishment of any large-scale safe havens for al Qaeda, ISIS, and other transnational extremist groups on Afghan soil,- to collaborate with Afghanistan against other regional extremist threats,- to maintain, in cooperation with Afghan partners, the forces and facilities essential to confront these threats, -to gradually contain and weaken the Taliban and other violent armed actors who continue to refuse to negotiate a peaceful and just settlement, and-to change the behavior of regional players, particularly Pakistan, to support Afghan stability. This could involve sharpening the incentives, both positive and negative, posed to Islamabad by Washington and other outside actions."