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Although Shia Iran and mainly Sunni Turkey have cool relations, they are on the proverbial same page insofar as the issue of Iraqi Kurds' drive for independence is concerned. The US, an adversary of Iran since the toppling of Shah Reza Pehlavi in the late 1970s but a strategic partner of Turkey under the umbrella of Nato, is also against the Kurdish bid for independence, describing the September 25 referendum as "illegitimate." As far as Russia, the new power broker in the Middle East, is concerned, it seems to have been avoiding taking a clear stance on the Kurdish vote, although it recognises Kurdish aspirations for independence. Syria, which also has a strong presence of Kurdish population, is deeply concerned about the situation, but it has had little or no time to deal with this issue in any effective and meaningful manner until only recently when Damascus' position remarkably strengthened against IS and other militant groups mainly due to help from Russia, Iran and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
Turkey, Iran and the government in Baghdad have legitimate fears about the Kurdish ballot. They are unanimous in their stance on the situation, arguing that the vote could provide momentum to the restive Kurdish movements, particularly the one led by the PKK in Turkey, and potentially unravel boundaries in the region, although Iraqi Kurdistan insists that its aspirations are confined to the boundaries of the Kurdish regional government based in Irbil. The US has relied on Kurdish help for many years, but it never supported any Kurdish demand for independence. Its current position is in accordance with its economic and strategic interests as it cannot afford to lose either Turkey or Iraq, or both, by backing the Kurdish drive for independence. From the US perspective, both Turkey and Iraq are important for regional stability and the two countries can help US regain whatever influence it has lost after the breakout of the "Arab Spring" in the region.
Since Irbil is an oil boomtown, and Iraq, a country battered by war and instability since the US invasion of Baghdad in March 2003, will never countenance any move that has a potential to undermine its share in the natural resources. Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan will therefore immediately find itself at war with Baghdad if it is able to achieve independence.
In their bilateral talks in Tehran recently, the presidents of Turkey and Iran vowed to work closely together to prevent disintegration of Iraq and Syria and to oppose the Iraqi Kurds' decision of secession that they expressed through a vote for independence in a September 25 referendum. "We want stability and security in the Middle East...The independence referendum in Iraq's Kurdistan is a sectarian plot by foreign countries and is rejected by Tehran and Ankara...We will not accept any change of borders under any circumstances," Iran's President Hassan Rouhani was quoted as saying.
Although both the leaders avoided naming the country on that occasion at least Israel has encouraged the Kurdish drive - a stance that clearly militates against its US patron's. Tel Aviv has been enjoying a strong relationship with Kurdish populations in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey since the days of its founder Ben Gurion. Its networks and operators in the Kurdish-dominated areas in the Middle East have been providing it with crucial help - intelligence; they are also often used by Tel Aviv to promote political instability and harm social discord in these Muslim countries. Since Israel has remained pitted against its immediate neighbours and others ever since its creation in 1948, it always worked harder to create strong links with Kurdish populations to cash in on growing disaffection in Kurdish areas in the Middle East. That the Kurds in Syria enjoyed better life than did their counterparts in Iraq, Iran and Turkey is a fact. But a protracted civil war since the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in north Africa and the Middle East in 2011 and a global fight against the IS have come as big opportunities for the country's Kurdish populations to find some autonomy in northeastern Syria near the Iraqi and Turkish borders.
No doubt, the Kurdish vote has added to the complexity of the Middle East region, which has already been witnessing, among other things, Syria civil war and an unprecedented diplomatic crisis or the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other Arab states. Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and US, among others, must involve Kurdish leaders in talks to forestall any potential disintegration of Iraq and help prevent outbreak of a new round of violence in the Middle East that could possibly result from the absence of fulfilment of Kurdish people's aspirations. They must take every possible step towards eliminating the sense of alienation among Kurds in all these countries and mainstreaming their social, cultural, economic and political life in their respective countries. There can be no other better solution.

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