Pakistan's increasing isolation

Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa is bending his back these days to convince a sceptical world that Pakistan does not harbour the Afghan Taliban or Haqqani Network in safe havens on Pakistani soil. That was again the gist of his message on February 17, 2018 at the Munich Security Conference. He said Pakistan had defeated al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups, and therefore no organised military camps exist on Pakistani soil today. General Bajwa also claimed that Pakistan has denied Islamic State (IS) any foothold in the country.
Now while the claims about 'defeating' al Qaeda and the TTP have considerable weight, realistically speaking, claiming 'victory' against shadowy terrorist groups is always fraught with risk. In the nature of things, insurgents faced with overwhelming military odds normally choose to move away to avoid a frontal collision that is likely to go badly for them. This is the inherent nature of guerrilla warfare, where the overwhelming superiority of the enemy is blunted by trading space for time, living to fight on another day. It is not certain how much of the post-bin Laden al Qaeda still survives in the badlands on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. We do know for sure that the al Qaeda ideological franchise has spread to many parts of the world. Ayman al-Zawahari, the successor of Osama bin Laden as leader of al Qaeda, was believed until some time ago to be still holed up in the border lands. But since he has not issued any of his ritual video messages since September 2017, it is not known how he is and where located, speculation notwithstanding.
As far as TTP is concerned, there is no denying that the Pakistan army has by and large driven them from their bases in FATA through Operation Zarb-e-Azb. However, their 'defeat' consists so far only in losing their base areas. They have relocated to Afghanistan just across the border and, taking advantage of the poorly policed area, are utilising Afghan soil to mount terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Such attacks would be difficult to mount though without secret sleeper cells inside Pakistan to fulfil the functions of logistics, safe houses, etc, for such forays. On the evidence therefore, it would be more accurate to describe the present state of the TTP as severely wounded, but not dead.
What is intriguing about General Bajwa's formulation is not so much what he mentions, but what he leaves out. There is no mention of the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network, the bone of contention with Washington and Kabul. A bit of historical context may not be out of place here.
After 9/11, the Taliban proved uncooperative in delivering Osama bin Laden to justice. They then suffered the 'shock and awe' invasion and occupation of their country by the US led at the time by George W. Bush. The Taliban at that juncture made the mistake of trying positional warfare against the invaders, whose advance phalanx struck with the awesome weight of modern air power. The rain of bombs forced the Afghan Taliban to break ranks and run to preserve whatever they could of their forces, albeit not without losing a great many fighters in the process. Their government in Kabul fell, and those that survived the US air onslaught sought refuge in Pakistan in FATA and the border areas of Balochistan. There they have remained to this day. General Bajwa may be right when he disclaims any 'safe havens', but perceptive observers have long argued that the US pressure on this issue would probably be met by converting the Afghan Taliban's 'safe havens' (ie organised military camps) into 'safe houses' (ie locations not visible to any 'eye in the sky'). If that is indeed what has transpired, General Bajwa has his work cut out for him in trying to persuade the world of Pakistan's stance.
That stance includes new, incremental elements of late. One, Pakistan is a victim of terrorism (true) and has made enormous sacrifices in the struggle against terrorism (also true when measured in human lives, disruption, economic losses, etc). Two, the terrorists operating inside Afghanistan do not need Pakistani soil to operate from since they control at least 40 percent of Afghan territory. Three, the terrorists carrying out attacks in Kabul and other cities probably meld into the residual 2.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (this argument's logic contradicts the second argument above).
Are these arguments winning the day for Pakistan internationally, let alone with sceptical Washington and Kabul? The weight of evidence is to the contrary. The US, Afghanistan, the west and large parts of the rest of the world regard the discriminatory actions of the Pakistan military as the latest manifestation of the 'good Taliban, bad Taliban' binary. In other words, Pakistan picks and chooses to attack Taliban who challenge the Pakistan state, while turning a blind eye to, if not collaborating with, Taliban who attack neighbouring Afghanistan.
And lest we be misled into thinking that we only have problems with the US over Afghanistan, the recent flurry of actions against Jamaat ud Dawa on the eve of the review of Pakistan's anti-terrorism financing regime by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an indicator that the Pakistani authorities are aware of the severe financial and economic consequences of that review going against them. Whether the takeover of Jamaat ud Dawa's assets, including its Muridke complex, will prove sufficient in the absence of similar actions against other UN-proscribed (and banned by Pakistan) terrorist groups operating from and within Pakistan remains to be seen.
Despite US President Donald Trump's by now well known belligerent demeanour, the US administration appears constrained by the Pentagon's advice. This US institution remains the best friend the Pakistan army has in Washington. There are a number of reasons for this. One, frictions over Afghanistan notwithstanding, the Pentagon sees Pakistan's battle hardened army as its best ally in the region and beyond. Two, the logistical considerations of the ongoing Afghan war restrict Washington's room for manoeuvre against Pakistan. That is what explains the 'good cop, bad cop' routine being practiced by Washington vis-à-vis Pakistan.
These considerations do not apply in the realm of bilateral aid (cut off recently) or turning the financial and economic screws on Islamabad. The FATF gambit may well be followed to deny or make prohibitively expensive multilateral lending to a foreign exchange-strapped Pakistan. Neither China, despite its heavy investments in Pakistan under CPEC, nor any other country can or will step in to plug this impending hole in our finances. This turning of the financial screws on Pakistan is likely to remain the preferred option for Washington, since it can ostensibly be presented as unrelated to the latter's concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan or even, arguably, groups in Pakistan targeting Indian Held Kashmir. Watch this space.
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