Civil service reform

The taskforce headed by Dr Ishrat Husain on civil service reform has come out with the first item in its daunting task. This first item pertains to the procedure for federal secretaries' appointment and tenure. The taskforce recommends that a committee comprising the cabinet secretary, establishment secretary and the principal secretary to the prime minister forward a panel of three suitable officers for appointment as federal secretaries. It would be up to the prime minister to choose one of the suggested panel. In case the prime minister does not consider any of the panel members fit for the post, the committee will be asked to recommend a new panel. Effectively, this reform does not leave any room or authority with the prime minister to appoint any officer as the secretary of any ministry or division on his own, i.e., it institutionalises the process and is intended to avoid or eliminate arbitrariness and bias. Once the prime minister chooses an officer from amongst those recommended by the committee for appointment as the secretary of a ministry or division, the officer will be on probation for six months, during which he/she could be removed or changed if his/her performance is unsatisfactory or on disciplinary grounds. After the completion of this six-month probation period, and if the officer's performance is found satisfactory, he/she will be confirmed for a protected three-year tenure. During his/her tenure, the incumbent cannot be transferred except if disciplinary action is initiated against the officer for corruption, negligence of duties, insubordination, misconduct or failure to meet the performance targets set for him/her. If evidence establishes the officer is at fault on any of the above counts, the prime minister can decide that the officer should be transferred during his tenure, provided the reasons for the shifting are recorded in writing. Dr Ishrat Husain has long argued that one of the most important problems facing the bureaucracy is the frequent transfer of civil servants (read insecurity of tenure). The importance therefore of security of tenure is underlined in this first reform. This security can help re-establish the objectivity and integrity of civil servants' advice and functioning rather than the present affliction of serving their political bosses' whims and will. This was the case with the civil service in the 1950s and the 1960s, until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's ill thought through changes to the security of tenure and other civil service reforms arguably led to the present disorder and malfunctioning of the bureaucracy. Besides, security of tenure promises the training and experience of the officer in question will benefit the ministry or division he heads, thereby contributing to the efficacious functioning of the state. Also, empirical evidence shows lack of continuity of the person in charge impacts negatively on government's policies, programmes and projects, which cannot be completed on time or within the projected cost.
Reform must always be thoroughly thought through as to its implications and impact on existing state structures, especially the civil service. Like it or not, we inherited the 'steel frame' of the British Empire in the shape of the bureaucracy. The in-service training, further education and hands-on experience of the job is what gave top bureaucrats their once formidable standing and reputation. For narrow expedient political reasons, the populist government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided the powerful bureaucracy needed to be cut down to size. Inadvertently, and without being conscious of this implication, the move resulted in throwing the baby of civil service integrity and efficiency out with the bath water of the intent to weaken the all-powerful civil service. The results since then have been a merry-go-round or revolving door of appointments and transfers of civil servants by successive governments, civil and military, leading to an erosion of the once sterling qualities of these servants of the state. The situation therefore underscores the need for rolling back the manipulable arbitrary regime of civil servants' appointment and transfers in favour of an institutionalised, multi-centred procedure whose transparency and integrity must be demonstrated in practice to overcome the present parlous state of the bureaucracy.