Many voted for PTI not so much for the love of it as their disillusionment with the rest. PTI promised hope and the disillusioned grabbed it. Some even voted for the likes of (oh, forget it. It's quite a list) just to give PTI a lift up. The chance of New Pakistan - happier, more just, and pro-poor - was the good that we cheered for.
The good was off to a good start. His first address to the Nation was statesman-like. He reached out to the bureaucracy to bolster their morale and the top-level appointments set the tone. He balanced his inexperienced cabinet with experienced and well respected advisors. His austerity measures were well received.
Then, inexplicably, somersaults started, and not necessarily because reality clashed with idealism. He was obliged to ask for a three-month reprieve from the critics and we agreed it was a fair demand.
After hundred days it is in the 'good' that fear lurks - policy not keeping pace with the promise. Of course, no one expected a hundred day miracle but are there troubling early signs?
We wait with hope for a good outcome of all that has been outsourced to task forces, generally consisting of able people. We know that our problems are old and need a new therapy. We also know 'new thinking' cannot come from within the existing government machinery. What we do not know is why did PTI not know this 200 days ago. What we do not know is how the new thinking will gel with the old machinery.
What we fear is not U-turns, now declared to be the hallmark of a great leader, but the absence of a roadmap. Shifting position to changing scenarios is part of governance - going to the IMF rather than committing suicide is clearly a saner option. What really matters is the strategic approach, a roadmap, and not consistency.
We have no idea who said 'consistency is the virtue of small minds'. There are several attributions, including one to Emerson. Some also attribute it to, yes, Napoleon; now held responsible for defeat on the Russian front because he did not make a U-turn! Perhaps our leader would have been better advised to quote Huxley ('the only completely consistent people are the dead'), or Keynes ('when I get new information I change my mind; what do you do, Sir').
Or even ZAB. When Fallaci told him of Mrs Gandhi accusing him of saying 'one thing today and tomorrow another', ZAB responded "an intellectual should never cling to a single and precise idea; he should be elastic". [He did emphasize, though, that the "basic concept should remain firm"].
What we actually fear is if U-turns, now made a virtue of, signal a softening of resolve. We have something to worry about if you react to events instead of shaping them; if you surrender in the name of Policy adjustment, as has happened more than once. That will weaken the promise of hope. That will be victory of the old.
Our other fear is reneging on the campaign promise of greater transparency in matters of State. Towards this end, we were also assured of (the UK style) PM's question hour in the parliament, something that now seems to have slid down the agenda.
There is a lot to hear but little to know. No one is telling us why the first visit to KSA was not successful (due to 'unacceptable conditions of assistance'?) but the second one was. What happened? Why are we being told that China has asked us not to make public the assistance it is giving us? If it is such a state secret why mention it at all, and embarrass the Chinese? If the immediate current account crisis is behind us, as the Finance Minister has forcefully proclaimed, why can't the numbers be shared with us? Or was it just to talk the markets up?
Pressed for delay in approaching the IMF we were told the Government had asked the IMF to field a mission 'on the tenth day' of assumption of office. IMF came, and left, to return again. What we are not being told are the points of difference. Why were the negotiations inconclusive and what is going to change between now and the next visit? Shall we assume they are asking for what the government cannot give, ostensibly for unbearable political costs? Fair enough, but then why ask them to come again - unless some foreign policy shift, that might soften the IMF stance, is in the works?
Our greatest hope remains that this government will set new standards of political propriety - that the politicians, unlike in the past, will be held accountable for any transgressions. This was put to test in a disturbing number of cases where the bureaucracy resisted unlawful political interference only to get chastised, without our being made aware of any action against the errant politicians.
Unfortunately, it is this background that will contextualize the proposal to have Federal Secretaries serve on 'probation' for six months. It will be viewed more as a loyalty test than a performance test. The whole argument of letting the civil service have a greater say in civil service appointments (three senior Secretaries recommending a panel) is that after working together for 30 years or so they would know their colleagues' strengths and weaknesses better. The logic of this argument allows no room for 'probation' at the senior most levels.
It appears there is political resistance to tenure and the probation proposal is a 'partial equilibrium' solution. Well, partial equilibrium, or the second-best theory, leaves neither party happy, especially where there are factors beyond the control of either. The proposal ignores the reality of the other two masters (NAB and Judiciary) that impacts civil service 'performance'.
It won't work - and the government will be accused of another U-turn.
Even those who are not for this government should not want it to fail. Elected or selected, it represents hope. Despondence, a natural outcome of the failure of this government, is what the nation cannot afford. The government can help by communicating better.
The government chose to make 'Hundred days' an important milestone. It can use it to declare victory or do some sober introspection. The Honeymoon is over.
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