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Between a Khawaja and an Imam Sindh Government has lost more than face. Government's writ stands challenged. It brings into question the provincial government's right to control, direct, and hold accountable its civil servants, including those placed at its disposal by Islamabad.

Inspector General Khawaja got the court's backing; IG Kalim Imam that of the Federal Government (and now the court's endorsement as well). If law and order is a provincial responsibility, shouldn't the provincial government have more of a say in who should head its police force?

Why is it that non-police officers, sometimes considerably senior to the IG, sometimes 'nominally' his bosses, are shunted around by the provincial government at will, with no regard to niceties of tenure, and there is no storm in the tea cup? Why should an IG's 'premature' transfer cause such a tempest?

And we find it hard to buy that the IG falls on the wrong side of the government because he resists bad governance. Sad to say, but careers in the civil services are built on compromises; some less than the others but burden-free are only the rare few. It is hard, therefore, to think of IGs as born-again zealots tilting at windmills of sifarish and wrongdoing, parading themselves as champions of rule of law.

How IGPs are appointed, and removed, is clearly a matter of public interest.

We thought it was insane but had gotten used to SHOs being shuffled like a deck of cards. It was like the Monopoly board game where the choicest properties go to the most daring -outflanking competition and bidding high. Now we see IGPs being rolled like dice. Punjab has had five. Why should Sindh be far behind?

Except, at that level it can't possibly be one out-bidding the other. Perhaps, friends in high places get you this onerous job; or maybe it is just luck of the draw - the ball tracking into the right slot on the roulette wheel.

All potential candidates are experienced officers, have a reasonable service record, wear the badges of rank of a major general - occasionally you might even have one with badges of a Lt. General - and chest full of medals. How do you screen them to find the most suitable one to head the police force of a province?

Extended stints of service, at operational levels in the concerned province, would be an obvious criterion. How else would you expect a provincial government to engage in meaningful 'consultations' with the Federal Government, as the rules of appointment require? In IG Imam's case government of Sindh played blind as he did not have any recent experience of policing in Sindh.

Is the general reputation of the officer a criterion? That's word of mouth and too subjective a criterion for screening purposes. Performance appraisal reports don't help either. All but the simpletons get sterling reports. And there is no evidence of a proper career planning system to groom people for top positions.

Are we then to conclude that it is the people close to the Prime Minister - civil servants or advisers- who really decide? Does it make 'consultations' with the provincial government little more than tokenism? At best, the Province gets to choose from the 'list' offered to it by the Federal government. Are the seeds of politicization of the police force sown in the process of selection of its Commander?

And, once selected, who should the IG be accountable to: the provincial government whose bailiwick policing is; or the Federal government that controls the Police Service Officers?

Are the hands of the provincial government tied? It cannot proceed against the IG even where it finds his performance sub-par? Does the provision of the three year tenure override the issues of competence and delivering results? Who should decide if an IG is doing a good job or not?

It would appear in both matters - selection and removal of the IG - the provincial government ought to have the main say. But would that solve the problem? Would it ensure that public interest is better served? There is a strong likelihood of things getting no better, if not worse, even if the provincial governments get unfettered rights of appointment and removal.

In theory, security of tenure is of the essence. The tenure principle should apply to all civil servants, whether a Secretary or an IGP, under all governments - Provincial or Federal. You cannot expect good administration if the higher echelons are in a constant state of uncertainty, not knowing whether they are coming or going.

But who wants security of tenure?

The concept is alien to our political leadership's interests. 'Control' over civil servants is critical to securing their ambitions - some of them openly demand that they should decide who should be posted to their district. The threat of an early booting out is the sword of Damocles that the civil servants live under, and soon can't live without.

Civil Servants make a song and dance of it but happily forget the issue of tenure when a better opportunity arises. When was the last time we heard a civil servant resisting a transfer to a more coveted post just because he had spent only a few months is his current job?

The theory of security of tenure is only one half of the equation. It becomes meaningless if the other part, good performance, gets dropped out of equation. You give tenure not for the sake of it but as a means to achieve goals - and the ability to hold the civil servant accountable.

Mr. Imam has an impressive CV. He is highly regarded. That notwithstanding, Government of Sindh would have an impeccable case for his removal if it could demonstrate that he failed. That would only be possible if the government had set for him specific, realistic, and measurable goals. It would then be easier to establish his failure.

In the absence of any goals the government exposes itself to charges of the IG not toeing its politically motivated line. The argument shifts from failure to perform to political expediency. Mr. Imam becomes the winner despite being dubbed a failure.

Until the government learns to establish clear performance criteria for its civil servants power to select and remove will remain the wrong debate.

[email protected]

Copyright Business Recorder, 2020

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