An expedient deal

The signing of the 'peace' deal between the US and the Taliban in Doha on February 29, 2020 has been touted by Pakistan as proof of its role as a peace maker and facilitator in ending the 19-year-old Afghan conflict. But even the quietly triumphant note in Pakistani statements cannot ignore the difficulties still remaining in implementing the terms of the agreement. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, fresh from his 'victory' in Doha, had to concede it would not be a "smooth affair" but then dumped any adverse possibilities in the lap of unnamed "spoilers". In a press conference on March 1, 2020 after his return to Islamabad, Qureshi revealed he had suggested a number of steps to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (who, reports say, attended the Doha signing ceremony reluctantly and only as a 'guest' to build on the "great progress" reflected in the deal. Some of these steps included a prisoners swap, the start in timely fashion of the intra-Afghan dialogue, and reconstruction aid to an Afghanistan battered by almost half a century of wars to provide the conditions for a return of the Afghan refugees.

On the face of it the suggestions appear good, but there are attendant uncertainties that no side is willing to admit publicly. First and foremost, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has categorically rejected a prisoner swap of 5,000 Taliban prisoners with 1,000 held by the Taliban. On March 1, 2020, President Ghani made clear the Afghan government had made no such commitment. That is obvious since the Afghan government has studiously, and perhaps deliberately, been kept out of the Doha talks process from the very beginning. Although Ghani committed to honouring a partial truce that has seen a reduction of violence, he faces internal disquiet over the deal in which the government and other Afghan anti-Taliban forces were conspicuous by their absence. Ghani did leave the door ajar a crack by adding the prisoners swap issue could be discussed as part of the intra-Afghan dialogue due to start in Oslo on March 10, 2020. While the run of comment portrays the deal as a critical first step to peace, many Afghans see it as little more than a dressed-up US surrender that will ultimately see the Taliban return to exclusive power.

The intra-Afghan dialogue is still uncertain to start as scheduled since the make-up of the Afghan government delegation is still undecided. On the one hand, Ghani and his rival for the presidency, Abdullah Abdullah, are still at loggerheads over the controversial 2019 presidential election that has been officially declared as having been won by Ghani but which Abdullah hotly contests, going so far as to threaten the formation of a parallel government, in a weary replay of the previous presidential election that was only settled by a surface power-sharing arrangement negotiated by the US. On the other hand, who from civil society and other groups will form part of the government/anti-Taliban delegation is still not known. Ghani would prefer loyalists for the latter slot but that could produce a credibility issue and objections from the Taliban, who have consistently refused so far to meet the Afghan government they have dismissed in the past as a 'US puppet'.

President Ashraf Ghani has outlined the key issues attending the Oslo talks. Amongst these he has listed the Taliban's ties with Pakistan, accused of harbouring them since 2001, as well as their ties to terrorist groups (particularly al Qaeda) and drug cartels. It bears recalling that while in power the Taliban strictly banned drugs, but in opposition they were far from averse to taking advantage of the drug trade to finance their insurgency. President Ghani would also like clarification as to what would be the place in the new dispensation for the existing Afghan security forces and civil administration. For all this, Ghani's desire for a verifiable mechanism to monitor and ensure compliance by the Taliban begs a whole host of questions about how this is possible and who will take responsibility for it. So far, the only taker for this role is the US, which is hardly a disinterested party and, given US President Donald Trump's undisguised desire to withdraw US troops as soon as possible so he can boost his chances of re-election, may turn a blind eye to violations of the Taliban's commitments in order not to disrupt the troop withdrawal. The UN may have been a better choice but there appears no consensus or will there to take on this sticky task.

Even if the above roadblocks get sorted out in time and the Oslo talks begin, despite the Taliban's agreeing to an "inclusive government" of which they would be a part, the exact terms of such a power sharing arrangement promise difficult and testy exchanges. Afghans generally are torn between a desire for peace after decades of conflict and dread of the Taliban's return to power, given their hardline track record in power 1986-2001. Women in particular fear the Taliban have not changed their medieval mindset and may, once they are in control, reintroduce the restrictions on women's education and work that made life for Afghanistan's women a living hell.

Potential external 'spoilers' may include Iran, which has categorically dismissed the deal, arguing the US had no right to take decisions about Afghanistan's future, and may be just manoeuvring to extend its presence in Afghanistan that is the US's valuable listening post for the volatile region. It should not be forgotten that Iran too hosts a large numbers of Afghan refugees, a potential source of trouble for any future Taliban government.

Those with memories of the US withdrawal from the Vietnam War may be unsettled at the similarity of the two processes, despite differences of time and context. Then US President Richard Nixon, after winning the 1972 elections, agreed to withdraw US troops from that unwinnable war that took a heavy and bloody toll of the Vietnamese people. Within two years of the signing of the Geneva Accords, the world was treated to the spectacle of desperate people clinging to US military helicopters trying to get away before the Vietnamese people's forces arrived in Saigon. In that negotiation too Washington did not include its 'puppet' South Vietnamese government, which crumbled before the determined assault of the patriotic and revolutionary Vietnamese resistance forces.

Of course the differences too are glaring. The Vietnam War was part of the US's war on communism. The Afghan conflict has pitched the US behemoth against an extremist religious movement that has fought it to a standstill. But the end result may not be very different, with the triumphant Taliban sealing their victory with exclusive power once the actual and potential threat from the US abates and vanishes. No one in their right mind expects the US to be able to muster the political will to return to combat in Afghanistan whatever the Taliban's violations of the 'solemn' agreement signed in Doha.

The Taliban's ultimate triumph therefore seems only a matter of time. Will that outcome fulfil the hopes of Pakistan that peace and prosperity will follow? The jury is still out as it is contingent on whether and to what extent the anti-Taliban forces resist the onslaught. A new civil war cannot be ruled out. What effect continuing conflict will have on Pakistan's security also is up in the air since the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is still sitting across the border on Afghan soil, poised to strike.

Welcome to one more expedient deal by Washington, with an uncertain and potentially worrying fallout.

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